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Miloddan avvalgi 490 yil Karistni qamal qilish

Miloddan avvalgi 490 yil Karistni qamal qilish

Miloddan avvalgi 490 yil Karistni qamal qilish

Karistusni qamal qilish (miloddan avvalgi 490 yil) - marafon jangida tugagan kampaniyada forslarning birinchi g'alabasi. Ion qo'zg'oloni paytida isyonchilar Afinadan va Eubriyadagi Eretriyadan yordam olishgan. Doro I bu shaharlarni qo'zg'olonda ishtiroki uchun jazolashga qat'iy qaror qildi. Uning birinchi urinishi, miloddan avvalgi 492 yilda, kuyovi Mardonius qo'mondonligi bilan, Hellespont va Frakiya sohillari bo'ylab quruqlikdan foydalangan va shimoliy Athos tog'idagi bo'ronda fors floti vayron bo'lganidan keyin tugagan. Gretsiya (yunon-fors urushlari).

Doro ikkinchi bosqini miloddan avvalgi 490 yilda sodir bo'lgan. Bu safar u qo'shinini Egey dengizi bo'ylab yuborishga qaror qildi. Dediy Midiya va Artafrenning o'g'li Artifren o'g'li, Dariusning jiyani Kilikiyada yig'ilgan yangi armiya, unga katta flot, shu jumladan maxsus qurilgan ot transporti qo'shildi. Fors kuchlari g'arbdan Samosga ko'chib o'tdi, keyin Egariya orqali Icariya, Naxos va Delos orqali o'tdi.

Ularning Delosdan keyingi keyingi manzili Evistiyaning sharqiy uchida joylashgan Karist edi. Forslar karistlardan bo'lajak yurish uchun qo'shin etkazib berishni va garovga olinganlarni topshirishni talab qilishdi.

Karistlar fors talablarini rad etishdi. Datis va Artafren Karistni qamal qilishdi va uning atrofini vayron qilishdi. Bu karistlarni taslim bo'lishga ishontirdi va ular forslarning ustunligini qabul qilishga majbur bo'lishdi.

Keyin forslar Euboea qirg'oqlari bo'ylab suzib, Eretriya tomon yo'l olishdi va u erda ikkinchi g'alabani qo'lga kiritishdi. Eretriyadan ular Attikaga o'tib, Marafonga tushishdi va u erda mashhur mag'lubiyatni boshdan kechirishdi, bu ularni kampaniyani tark etishga majbur qildi.


Marafondan Thermopylaegacha Fors urushi afsonalarini ochib beradi (miloddan avvalgi 490–480 yillar)

Sardis Afinaliklar va Ioniyaliklar tomonidan qo'lga olinib, yoqib yuborilgani haqidagi xabar Doroga keltirildi va Miletlik Aristagor bu qo'shma harakatni qo'zg'atdi. Aytishlaricha, Doro uning ishi haqida eshitib, afinaliklar kimligini so'ragan. Aytishlaricha, u kamonini chaqirgan. U uni oldi va osmonga o'q uzdi: "Xudo menga afinaliklarni jazolashga ruxsat bersin". U qullaridan biriga har ovqatlanayotganda quyidagi so'zlarni uch marta takrorlashni buyurdi: "Ustoz, unutmang. Afinaliklar!

Hikoya kulgili, ammo xayoliy, tomoshabinlarni o'ziga jalb qiladi, lekin haqiqiylikni qidirishda unchalik ishonarli emas. Doro Frakiyada va undan shimolda kampaniya o'tkazgan, o'z saroyida yunon kelib chiqishi ko'p bo'lgan va Afinaning sobiq zolimi Gippiyaga yaqin bo'lgan, u 510 yilda quvilganida, Xellespontning Fors tomonidagi Sigeumga surgun qilingan. Darius afinaliklar haqida eslatishga hojat yo'q edi va u Mardoniusni Iellion qo'zg'oloni bostirilganidan bir necha oy o'tgach, Yunonistonga fors qo'shinlarini olib kirishga ko'rsatma berib, Hellespontin Frigiya va Frakiya uchun yangi satrap etib tayinlaganini eslatish kerak emas edi. Yunon materiklari, shu jumladan Afina haqida ham uzoq vaqt o'ylangan. Marathon va Thermopylae janglari, o'n yil farq bilan, lekin bir xil dushmanlar o'rtasida, shubhasiz, qadimgi Yunonistonning eslatib o'tilgan ikkita harbiy ishi bo'lib qolaveradi. Shunga qaramay, jang maydonlarining o'ziga va har bir epizodning tarixiy kontekstlariga kamroq e'tibor qaratiladi, ular odatda yunonlar va forslar o'rtasidagi urushlar haqida bir necha jumlalarni o'z ichiga oladi. 490 yil yozida Marafonda va 480 yil avgust oyining boshida Termopilada janglarga olib kelgan kampaniyalar qisman mashhur bo'ldi, chunki uning resurslari Yunoniston shaharlaridan ancha katta bo'lsa -da, Fors imperiyasining g'arbga qarab kengayishi to'xtatildi. va qisman asosiy manbaning qaddi tufayli, u yana Gerodot tarixiga bog'liq. Ishning shuhratiga qaramay, tarixning birinchi tarixchisi tomonidan berilgan bu janglar haqidagi tushunarsiz hikoya ko'plab jumboqlarni keltirib chiqaradi, ular ustidan g'alaba qozonish har qanday ma'noda tanqidiy tahlilni talab qiladi. Marafon va Termopil o'rtasida o'n yil bor bo'lsa -da, kampaniya 490 yilda forslar mag'lubiyatidan so'ng darhol boshlangan va Misrda qo'zg'olon ko'tarilganda 487 yilgacha davom etgan (Herodt. 7.1).

Doro Gellespontning Evropa chekkasidagi viloyatlarini kengaytirish niyatida edi, lekin marafondagi mag'lubiyat, hech qanday falokat bo'lmaganiga qaramay, uning rejalarini buzdi va o'sha chorakda tashabbusni qaytara olmaguncha, u 486 yilda vafot etdi. Misr qo'zg'oloni, Gretsiyaning janubiga bostirib kirish yana forslar va ularning yangi podshosi Kserksning asosiy maqsadiga aylandi, deb bostirildi. U 490 yildagi muvaffaqiyatsizlikni bartaraf etmoqchi edi, bu uning shohligining qadr -qimmatiga to'g'ridan -to'g'ri tahqir edi va garchi u yunon termopiley himoyachilarini qirib tashlagan bo'lsa -da, bu umumiy kampaniyadagi kichik g'alabadir. Marafon va Termopilalar Salamis va Plateyadan ko'ra ko'proq mashhur tasavvurga egadirlar, shuning uchun bu erda voqealarni real va tarixiy kontekstda joylashtirish uchun ikkita jang maydonini kuzatishga e'tibor qaratiladi. Butun urushni emas, balki faqat ikkita jangga e'tibor qaratishining sababi, birinchidan, ular geografik jihatdan bir -biriga juda yaqin, ikkinchidan, quruqlikdagi janglarga dengizdagi voqealar katta ta'sir ko'rsatgan bo'lsa -da, uchinchidan, ikkalasi ham bir yoki ikkita kichik kuchlarni o'z ichiga olgan. Bu jangovar jangda kutilgan katta kuch va harbiy kuch emas edi.

Kichik Osiyoning g'arbiy qirg'og'ida tinch sharoitlar tiklanganidan bir necha oy o'tgach, Doro o'zining yangi satrapi Mardoniusga Megabaz tomonidan boshlangan ishni davom ettirishni va butun Yunon materikini bo'ysundirish maqsadida Egeyning shimoliy qirg'og'i bo'ylab yurish qilishni buyurdi. Herodt. 6.44). Mardonius Xellespontdan o'tishdan oldin, Ioniya va Gerodot shaharlariga tashrif buyurdi, bu yangi satrapning eng kutilmagan ishorasi, u yaqinda zabt etilgan shaharlarga demokratik hukumatlar o'rnatdi. Bu qismlarda ilgari forslar yoqtirgan zulmga yo'l qo'yilmas edi. Diodorning so'zlariga ko'ra (10.25.4), Hekatey Lidiya satrapi Artaferni aynan shunday harakatga undagan bo'lsa, bu ajablanarli bo'lmasligi kerak edi. Bundan tashqari, Gerodot, ba'zi sobiq rahbarlar Xellespont bo'ylab o'z shaharlariga qaytarilganini ta'kidlagan bo'lsa -da, Ioniya haqida hech narsa aytmaydi, bu shuni ko'rsatadiki, forslar yakka hukmdorlar orqali boshqaruvni o'rnatish xalq tomonidan qo'llab -quvvatlanmagan. Mardoniusning farmoni mahalliy aholini xushnud etish istagidan kelib chiqmagan, biroq u kampaniya davomida bu shaharlardan moliyaviy va moddiy yordam olishi kerakligini bilgan. Boshqa fuqarolik tartibsizliklarini oldini olish uchun, odamlar o'z xohish -istaklari va xohish -istaklariga bo'ysunsalar, ular o'zlarini hukmronlik qilishadimi yoki zolimlar tomonidan boshqariladimi, bu uning uchun muhim emas edi. Gerodot buni ajoyib voqea sifatida ko'rsatdi, lekin bu faqat oqilona siyosat masalasi va Evropada yangi korxonani logistika rejalashtirishning bir qismi edi.

492 yilning yozining boshida Mardonius o'z qo'shinini, Gidlespontning eng tor nuqtasi - Abidosdan Sestosga ko'chirish orqali tez ko'chib o'tdi. U erdan quruqlik bo'ylab yurgan fors qo'shinlari xavotirlanmas edilar, chunki Megabazus Proponsning g'arbiy qirg'og'idan Chersonesegacha, keyin Frakiyada Strimon daryosigacha fors hukmronligini o'rnatgan edi. Mardoniusning maqsadi faqat Gretsiya bo'lishi mumkinligi hammaga ayon bo'lishi kerak edi, chunki Makedoniya qiroli Doriy bilan shartnoma tuzganidan so'ng, Fessaliyaga yo'l ochiq edi. Biroq, ishlar reja bo'yicha ketmadi. Dastlab, Tasosning muvaffaqiyatli ishg'oli bo'ldi, u qarshiliksiz tortib olindi, lekin keyin qo'shin bilan birga kelgan flot Chersonese shahridagi Athos tog'ining bo'ronida ushlandi. Yoz oylarining shimoliy yoki etesian shamollari zo'ravonlik bilan o'tishi mumkin va ayniqsa qadimgi yuk tashish uchun xavfli bo'lgan. Shu munosabat bilan Gerodotning yozishicha, uch yuzta kema cho'kib ketgan va ularning ekipajidan yigirma mingga yaqin odam o'ldirilgan, ba'zilari suzishni bilmay qolganlari uchun, boshqalari akula hujumlari qurboniga aylanishgan, boshqalari esa tosh ustida ushlangan. (Herodt. 6.44). Frakiya qabilasi Brigilar kechasi kutilmaganda hujum qilishganda, armiya to'satdan muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchradi. Ko'rinib turibdiki, forslar bexabar qabul qilingan va Mardoniusning o'zi jarohat olgan. Ammo general, bu qabilani jazolamaguncha, oldinga siljishdan bosh tortdi, ammo natijasi shundaki, kampaniya mavsumi boshqa hech qanday ijobiy natijalarsiz yakunlandi va Mardonius o'z qo'shinini Hellespontga olib ketdi. Herodotning ta'kidlashicha, Mardonius qo'shinlari shon -shuhratga ega bo'lmagan (Herodt. 6.45), garchi flotdagi falokat qo'mondonning qobiliyatsizligi tufayli bo'lishi mumkin edi. Keyinchalik Gerodot (Herodt. 6.94) Doro Mardoniyni yunonlarga qarshi buyruqdan ozod qilganini tasdiqlaydi.

O'sha yilning qishida Doro Tasos fuqarolariga o'z shaharlaridagi istehkomlarni buzib, kemalarini Abderaga jo'natishni buyurdi (Herodt. 6.46). Tasiliklar bir necha yillar oldin Histiaus tomonidan qamal qilingan edi, lekin u boy politsiyachi edi, deydi Herodot, Trakiyadagi oltin konlaridan yillik daromadi yiliga ikki yuzdan uch yuz talantgacha bo'lgan, fuqarolar tashqi tahdidlarga dengiz flotini kengaytirish orqali javob bergan. va shahar devorlarini mustahkamlash. 492/1 yilda ular Frakiyaning katta qismini va qo'shni barcha orollarni bosib olgan forslar bilan urushning befoyda ekanligini tan oldilar va shu bois mintaqadagi hukmron kuchlarning buyruqlariga bo'ysundilar. Doro, shuningdek, Yunonistonda o'z his -tuyg'ularini sinab ko'rmoqchi edi, chunki Mardonius o'tgan yili unchalik ahamiyat bermagan, balki Fors xazinasiga zarar etkazmaslik uchun. Doro aqlli hukmdor sifatida yaxshi eslangan va u o'z maqsadiga erishish uchun diplomatik usullardan foydalanishga qaror qilgan, lekin shu bilan birga u har doim realist bo'lib, keyingi harbiy kampaniyaga tayyorgarlik ko'rishni buyurgan va G'arbiy shaharlaridan talab qilgan. Kichik Osiyoda harbiy kemalar va transport kemalari tayyor. Bu orada, xabarchilar Egey orollari va Yunon materikidagi barcha shaharlarga, bu jamoalarning har biridan olov va suv talab qilib, ularga bo'ysunish belgisi sifatida yuborilgan. Orol jamoalari buni tezda bajarishga majbur bo'lishdi, chunki ko'pchilik hammasiga bir necha soat ichida fors tuprog'i tutgan. Dariusga bo'ysunishni taklif qiladigan orollardan biri, Salamis ko'rfazida va Afinaning ko'z oldida joylashgan Aegina (Herodt. 6.49) edi. Afinaliklar Spartaga rahbarlik qilib, Peloponnes Ligasi a'zolari bo'lgan eginaliklarning dushmanlik harakatiga aralashish uchun Spartaga murojaat qilishdi.

Sparta qiroli, militsiyalik Aristagoraning harbiy yordam so'rovlarini rad etgan o'sha Cleomenes, ko'p o'tmay Aeginaga keldi va garovga olindi, keyin xavfsiz saqlash uchun Afinaga jo'natildi. Bu eginliklar Forsga yaxshilik qilishdan bosh tortishmasligini ta'minlash edi. Forslar Aeginaning ichki ishlariga aralasha olmaganidan afsuslanishlari kerak edi, chunki bu shahar kuchli flotga ega edi va Doro Attika va Peloponnesga hujum boshlaganida uning porti foydali bazaga ega bo'lar edi. Ammo spartaliklar to'g'ridan -to'g'ri nishonga aylanmagan, chunki ular afrikaliklar va erretiyaliklar singari ioniyaliklar bilan jang qilmaganlar, shuning uchun Gretsiyaning janubida o'z o'rnini egallash imkoniyati, hech bo'lmaganda, yo'qolgan. Ko'rinib turibdiki, Spartaning hech bo'lmaganda bitta ittifoqchisiga qilingan hujum, ammo 510 yilda Gippiylar quvilganidan beri afinaliklar va spartaliklar o'rtasidagi aloqani yo'qotsa ham, Peloponnes uchun tahdid deb hisoblangan. Spartaliklar bu xavfni tan olishdi va darhol harakat qilishdi. Aegina fuqarolari Sparta podshosining harakatini yuqori baholagan bo'lishi mumkin va qasos olishni rejalashtirgan bo'lishi mumkin, lekin garovga olish kerakli natijani bergan va kelgusi besh-olti yil davomida Egina haqida hech narsa eshitilmagan. Peloponnes va Attika Fors bilan hech qanday aloqada bo'lishga qarshi birlashdilar, garchi ma'lum bo'lganidek, meditatsiya qilish juda keng tarqalgan edi.

Bu orada, 490 yil yozining boshida, Doro Tarsus yaqinidagi Kilikiyada yangi armiya va flotni yig'ishga buyurdi. Quruqlik qo'shinlari piyoda va katta otliqlar tarkibidan iborat edi va armiya Aleya tekisligida qo'shma qo'mondonlar Datis va Artaphernes, Lidiyaning oldingi satrapi bo'lgan Artaphernesning o'g'li tomonidan ko'rib chiqildi. Ikki yoki undan ortiq generallarni buyruqqa tayinlash, aniqki, forslar orasida odatiy hol edi va Ioniyadagi urushda samarali ishlatilgan edi, lekin bu holatda, ehtimol, Mardoniusning so'nggi muvaffaqiyatsizligiga javoban, ongli ravishda qabul qilingan qaror edi. Frakiyada yagona buyruq berildi. U erdan qo'shin Samosga suzib ketdi. Gerodot bu kuchni kuchli deb ta'riflaydi, lekin u qanchalik katta edi? Olti yuz triremadan tashkil topgan flotga (Herodt. 6,95) 102,000 eshkak eshuvchilar kerak bo'ladi, ulardan ba'zilari yengil qurollangan qo'shinlar sifatida ishlatilishi mumkin edi, bundan tashqari har bir harbiy kema o'ttiztasini olib o'tadigan yana 18000 og'ir piyodalar. Shunday bo'lsa -da, bu jami 120,000 haqiqiy bo'lmagan darajada yuqori va logistika nuqtai nazaridan muammoli ko'rinadi, ayniqsa etkazib berish. Bunday hajmdagi flotga oziq -ovqat va em -xashak olib keladigan ko'plab transport kemalari kerak bo'ladi, chunki mahalliy jamoalar moddiy yordam ko'rsatishga majbur bo'lardi. 490 yildagi 1200 dona floti ishonchli emas, shuningdek, ioniyaliklar va Egey orollari aholisi etarli miqdorda etkazib bera olmagan. Shuning uchun matnni boshqa o'qish talab qilinadi. Gerodot "trireme" nomini erkin yoki beparvolik bilan ishlatgan bo'lishi kerak, lekin unutganki, uning davrida bu hamma joyda ishlatilgan "kema" edi, marafon kampaniyasida bunday bo'lmagan. 490 yilda trememe hali ham nisbatan yangi qurilish edi va tarixchi otlar uchun transport kemalarini ("ot tashuvchi kemalar") nazarda tutganligi sababli, ular deyarli harbiy kemalar emas edi. Mingdan kam bo'lmagan otliq kuchlar qirqqa yaqin triremani talab qilar edi va bu kichikroq idishlar sonini ikki barobarga ko'paytirar edi, ayniqsa har bir askar uchun bir nechta ot bo'lsa. Bu shuni anglatadiki, jami olti yuz, ehtimol yuz yoki undan ham kichikroq transport kemalari edi. Bundan tashqari, ba'zi harbiy kemalar, shubhasiz, eski bireme yoki pentekonter qurilishiga tegishli edi. Umuman olganda, yuk tashish aralashmasidan tashkil topgan flot jami 80 ming eshkak eshuvchi, 10 000 piyoda va 2000 otliq askarlarini kamaytiradi. Bu kuch, albatta, qudratli edi, lekin bu materik Yunonistonga to'liq bostirib kirish uchun mo'ljallanmagan, balki Afina va Eretriyaga qarshi jazolovchi ekspeditsiya sifatida yanada kengroq hududga fors hukmronligini joriy etish uchun kuchliroq kuch yuborilishidan oldin vayronagarchilikni keltirib chiqardi. Gerodot, ehtimol, bu erda tuzatilishi mumkin bo'lgan fors kuchlarining hajmini va kuchini tasodifan oshirib yuborgan bo'lishi mumkin, lekin uning tomoshabinlari uchun, agar ular zamonaviy triremalar haqida o'ylaganlarida, bu haqiqatdan ham ta'sirli bo'lardi. Filo, ehtimol, Samosga qisqa o'tish joyidan oldin Miletga qo'ng'iroq qilgan, lekin shimolga Hellespont tomon yo'l olish o'rniga, ikki qit'a o'rtasidagi odatiy o'tish joylari Icari dengizi bo'ylab janubi-g'arbiy tomonga suzib ketishgan. Herodotning ta'kidlashicha, bu yo'nalish avvalgi yozda forslar Athos tog'i atrofida katta yo'qotishlarga uchraganidan beri tanlangan va bu yo'ldan butunlay voz kechishga qaror qilgan. Ochiq dengiz orqali, ayniqsa, otliq bo'linmalari bo'lgan qo'shinni, hatto orollarga yaqin tutish, fors generallari va ehtimol Doriyning yana bir yangiliklari edi.

"Marafon kampaniyasi" deyarli Naxos ekspeditsiyasining uglerod nusxasi sifatida boshlandi va Naxos floti Samosdan g'arbga suzib kelganidan beri birinchi maqsadlardan biri edi. Naxiylar, albatta, bu yaqinlashib kelayotgan tahdid haqida ogohlantirilgandir, lekin ular Megabates va Aristagor boshchiligidagi fors hujumidan ruhiy himoyalanishdan farqli o'laroq, hech qanday himoya taklif qilmaganlar. Bu so'nggi ekspeditsiyaning hajmi, ehtimol, o'z shahrini tashlab, tepaliklarga qochib ketgan naxliklar uchun juda qo'rqinchli bo'lishi mumkin. Forslar shaharni va ibodatxonalarni talon -taroj qilib, yoqib yuborib, yo'llarini davom ettirdilar. Bu epizod bir necha kun ichida ro'y bergan bo'lishi kerak va Gerodot tomonidan unchalik yoritilmagan, garchi bu erda o'quvchiga hikoyadan ko'ra ko'proq narsa bo'lsa kerak. Naxiylar bundan o'n yil oldin ham hujumga dosh berishga ishongan edilar, ammo 490 yilda bunga urinishmadi. Bu bir qancha sabablarga bog'liq bo'lishi mumkin, chunki hujum yozning boshida, o'rim -yig'im yig'imidan oldin va qishdan keyin oziq -ovqat ta'minoti eng past darajada bo'lganida, blokadani ko'rish uchun etarli miqdorda materiallar yo'q edi. Naxos siyosiy rahbariyatining o'zgarishi edi, bu forslar bilan tuzilgan kelishuvga kamroq qarshilik ko'rsatdi. Gerodot (6.49), barcha orollar Doroga olov va suv taklif qilganini da'vo qilgan, shuning uchun hujum kutilmagan va asossiz bo'lishi mumkin edi. Nihoyat, ba'zi Ioniya shaharlarining taqdiri misoli hali ham orolni mudofaa qilish uchun arzimas taklifga aylantiradigan darajada yangi edi.

Datis Delos orolini ham bosib oldi, garchi aholi forslar kelishidan oldin qochib ketishgan. Forslar hurmat qilgan Apollon va Artemisga sig'inish sababli, orol talon -taroj qilinmadi va odamlarini qaytishga taklif qilishdi. Fors floti Evistiyaning janubidagi Karistusga qo'nishdan oldin qisqa masofani bosib o'tishi kerak edi. Datis allaqachon tashrif buyurgan barcha orollarni topshirishni majburlagan va har biridan qo'shin va garovga olinganlarni yig'ib olgan edi. Endi u Karistus fuqarolaridan ham qo'shnilariga qarshi urushga qo'shilishlarini talab qildi, lekin katta qiyinchiliklarga qaramay, ular rad etishdi. Qamal boshlandi va shahar atrofidagi er vayron bo'ldi, Karist xalqi forslarga taslim bo'ldi va shahar vayron bo'lishdan qutuldi. Eretriyaliklar bir necha kun oldin ularga hujum qilishlari haqida ogohlantirgan bo'lsalar -da, lekin, albatta, Karistusga hujum qilishdan oldin Fors ekspeditsiyasi haqidagi xabarlarni eshitgan bo'lishadi. Ular Afinaga yordam so'rab xabarchilar yuborishdi va afinaliklar darhol javob berishdi, Gerodotning so'zlariga ko'ra, bundan bir necha yil oldin Xalkisga tegishli erlarga joylashtirilgan oilalardan bo'lgan to'rt ming kishilik kuch. Bunday tezkor va ijobiy reaktsiyani Eretriyaliklarning Fors tahdidiga qanday qarshi turish kerakligi bo'yicha ikkiga bo'linadigan o'xshash harakatlari nusxa ko'chirmadi. Bir guruh shahardan qochib, atrofdagi tepaliklar xavfsizligini ta'minlamoqchi edi, ehtimol ular shunday qilishgan - boshqa bir guruh kelajakda shaxsiy manfaatlarini ko'zlab, shaharni jangsiz dushmanga topshirish niyatida bo'lgan. Aeschines ismli Eretriya fuqarosi bu xiyonat haqida ogohlantirildi va u afinaliklarga xabar berdi, ular birdaniga orqaga chekinib, bo'g'ozdan o'tib, falokatdan qutulib qolishdi.

Fors floti Eretriya yaqinidagi bir qancha plyajlarga qo'ndi (Gerod 5.100) va ular shaharga hujum uyushtirishga tayyorgarlik ko'rishdi, bu shahar himoyalangan bo'lib qoldi, chunki ko'p fuqarolar qolishga qaror qilishdi, ammo jang qilish uchun etarli darajada ishonchlari yo'q edi. istehkomlaridan tashqarida. Ko'rinib turibdiki, forslar shaharga hujum qilishgan, lekin hech qanday maxsus qamal uskunalari haqida hech narsa aytilmagan va ular, ehtimol, devor devorlarining bir qismini buzishga e'tibor qaratishgan. Jang olti kun davom etdi va ko'p qurbonlar bilan davom etdi, lekin aniq bir xulosaga kelmasdan turib, fors tarafdorlari bo'lgan posbonlar eshikni ochishdi yoki devorlarning bir qismini himoyasiz qoldirish uchun muvaffaqiyatli ulanishdi. Forslar qo'shin yuborishdi va shahar to'rlari boshlanishi bilan muxolifat butunlay qulab tushdi. Xiyonatkorlar, Gerodot (5.101) tomonidan Evforbus va Filagr nomi bilan atalgan, ular shubhasiz yaxshi mukofotlangan, lekin Eretriyada qolishiga ruxsat berilmagan, balki boshqa joyga ko'chirilgan bo'lishi mumkin. Miloddan avvalgi 400 yildan keyin yozilgan "Anabazis" da (8.7), Ksenofon, yozuvchi yollanma askar bo'lgan Fors shohi Artaxerxes II ga qarshi qo'zg'olon va uning oqibatlarini tasvirlaydi, unda yozuvchi yollanma askar sifatida qatnashgan. Eretriyaning ma'lum bir Gongilusi. Gongylus 490 yilda Eretriya xiyonatida qatnashgan, unga Misiyadan erlar berilgan. Uning beva xotini Hellas hali ham Keygus vodiysida, keyinchalik Pergam shahriga aylangan narsalardan birida yashagan.

Eretriya na yirik aholi punkti, na himoyalanish uchun juda yaxshi joy edi, garchi u teatr tepasidagi tepalikdagi ta'sirli akropolga ega bo'lsa. Ehtimol, aholisi yigirma mingdan oshmagan, shuning uchun uni forslar tomonidan bosib olinishini oldindan aytish mumkin edi. Qo'lga tushganlar Kichik Osiyoga asir sifatida olib ketilib, joylashtirildi. Afina Dafnefor ibodatxonasi hujumchilar tomonidan Sardisdagi ma'badning yonib ketishi uchun qasos olish uchun yondirilgan va talon -taroj qilingan. Datis, albatta, ko'rsatmalarni bajarar edi, lekin shaharni davolashda saxiyroq bo'lish oqilroq bo'lardi. Aslida, erretiyaliklarga berilgan jazoning og'irligi milesiyaliklarga o'xshab, tarixning yunon yozuvchilari tomonidan bo'rttirilgan bo'lishi mumkin. Milet singari, Eretriya ham tezda tuzalib ketdi, uning fuqarolari, ko'pchiligi Evoeyaning boshqa joylariga xavfsiz joylarga qochib ketishgan bo'lsa -da, qaytishdi va o'z shaharlarini qayta qurishdi, garchi Afina ma'badi uzoq vaqt tiklangan bo'lsa ham. Oradan atigi o'n yil o'tib, materikni fors hukmronligidan qutqargan ittifoqchi yunon flotida erretlar 499 yilda iyoniyaliklarga yordam berish uchun yuborgan jangovar kema sonini berdilar. va keyingi adabiyotlarda qabul qilinganidek.

Bir necha kundan keyin forslar o'z qo'shinlarini qaytadan tashlab, Attika tomon yo'l olishdi, lekin Afinaliklarni tayyor holda tutishning hech qanday imkoniyati yo'q edi, chunki Eretriyadagi voqealar Oropdan kuzatilgan edi. Ehtimol, fors floti skautlar tomonidan soyalangan bo'lishi mumkin, chunki u Eretriyadan pastga tushib, Ramnosdan o'tib, deyarli Afina fuqarolaridan iborat armiya joylashib, kutib turardi. Marafon tekisligi ikki qirrali boshli joylar orasida, ayniqsa, janubiy chekkasidagi Pentelikon tog'lari oralig'ida kamida besh kilometrga cho'zilgan. Tekislik chuqurligi tepaliklardan taxminan ikki kilometr (2000 yard) masofada joylashgan bo'lib, dengizdan Attikaning markaziy qismiga kiradi. Dengiz sathi, shu jumladan landshaft jang paytidan deyarli o'zgarmadi. O'lgan afinaliklar sharafiga yig'ilish 490 yildagidek bugungi kunda ham ko'zga tashlanadi va quruqlikdan yoki kema orqali o'tayotgan sayyohlarga yaqqol ko'rinib turadi. Shubhasiz, bugungi kunda landshaft uy -joy va dehqonchilikdagi zamonaviy o'zgarishlar bilan o'zgargan, ammo jang maydonining umumiy tabiati o'zgarishsiz qolmoqda. 490 yildagi erdan foydalanish butalar va daraxtlar tarqalgan kichik fermer xo'jaliklaridan iborat bo'lishi mumkin edi, lekin ular Osiyodan ehtiyotkorlik bilan olib ketilgan otliqlarni samarali joylashtirish uchun etarli darajada edi.

Afinaliklar tomonidan yig'ilgan kuchlar kuchli muxolifatni qo'lga kiritmagan yoki kampaniyani uzaytirganga o'xshaydi. Attika qabilalarining har biridan o'n mingga yaqin qo'shin Afinadan hujumchilarni kutib olish uchun yo'l oldi, bu kuch bundan o'n yil oldin forslar hujumini naxiyaliklardan ikki mingga ko'p edi, lekin yaqinda jangsiz taslim bo'lgan. Dushman, ayniqsa, otliq bo'linmalarda, umuman olganda, raqamli ustunlikka ega bo'lishi kerak edi, garchi bu harbiy qo'lda muammo bo'lsa -da, chunki Attika erining tabiati katta otliqlarni joylashtirish uchun yaroqsiz edi. Attikaning shimoliy va g'arbiy kvartallari, shuning uchun Afinaning maqsadi bo'lgan har qanday kuchlar uchun yo'l, ayniqsa, vodiylar va tik yonbag'irlari bilan tepaliklardir. Bu shuni anglatadiki, forslar samarali ishlashlari mumkin bo'lgan joylarda juda cheklangan edi. Afinaning janubi -g'arbidagi Attika va Phaleronning g'arbiy sohilidagi marafonda otliqlar sonining ustunligi va flotda sayohlarni o'tkazish uchun joy bor edi. Aks holda, otliq askarlardan foydalanish har qanday hujum qiluvchi armiya uchun nogironlik va tizimli zaiflikka aylanishi mumkin edi. Va bu aslida nima bo'lganligi aniq. Forslarni bu hududni yaxshi biladigan va hech bo'lmaganda ba'zi maslahatlar berishga qodir bo'lgan Gippiylar Marafonga olib borar edilar, lekin u ham bu korxonaning muvaffaqiyatidan qo'rqardi. Agar u bu xavotirni aytmagan bo'lsa, bu keyinchalik unga qarshi hech qanday salbiy so'zlar aytilmasligini ta'minlash edi. Gippiylar, fors qo'mondonlari kabi, agar ular jang maydonini nazorat qilmasalar, dushman katta ustunlik bilan boshlanishini bilishar edi va oddiygina ular yunonlarga, asosan, piyoda askarlarning kichik kuchlari bilan, jangovar harakatlarni yuqori erdan boshlashga ruxsat berishar edi. tushirildi yoki harakatga keltirildi.

Marafon kampaniyasi tarixiy afsonaga aylanganini, agar kur'alchi Fididippidlar haqidagi ertak uchrab tursa, osonlikcha aniqlash mumkin. Afinaliklar o'zlarining ittifoqchilaridan faqat, ya'ni Boeotiyaning janubiy chekkasidagi Plataea, ehtimol, mavjud bo'lgan ishchi kuchining katta qismini yuborgan kichik bir jamoadan qo'shimcha kuch olgan. Plata kontingenti mingga yaqin edi va tekislikning shimoliy tomonidagi chap qanotda joylashishi kerak edi. Afina generallari ham Spartaning yordamiga umid qilishardi. Agar spartaliklar qo'shin yuborgan bo'lsa, Peloponnesning boshqa shaharlari etakchilik uchun Spartaga murojaat qilgan. Herodotning ta'kidlashicha, Afina armiyasi shaharga to'liq yig'ilishidan oldin va shuning uchun, ehtimol, jangdan bir hafta oldin Fidippidlarga Spartaga yugurib, yordam so'rab murojaat qilish buyurilgan. Nega apellyatsiya so'ngi paytgacha afinaliklar so'rov yuborishi mumkin bo'lgan oxirgi daqiqagacha qoldirilganligi tushuntirilmagan va matndagi dramatik ixtiro darajasini ochib bermaydi. Afina va Sparta orasidagi masofa taxminan yuz ellik kilometr (100 milya). Ikki marta Gerodot aytadi (Herodt. 6.107), Pheidippides Pan xudosi bilan ikki marta uchrashgan, yo Dionisning timsoli, yoki xudoning o'zi yo'lda. Bu yozuvda Pan yoki Dionisning mavjudligi tasodifiy voqea emas, lekin bu xudoga sig'inishning Afinadagi kelib chiqishi va uning Marafon tekisligining janubi -g'arbiy tomonida joylashgan Pentelikon tog'idagi g'origa bog'liq. . Aytishlaricha, yuguruvchi tog 'yonbag'irining odati bo'lgan xudo bilan uchrashgan, bu safar Peloponnesning Tegea shahrining tepasida Parfenium tog'ida va Lakoniya chegarasida. Pan Pheidippidesga murojaat qilib, nega unga Afinada sharaf berilmadi, chunki u ilgari o'z xalqiga yordam bergan va kelajakda ham shunday bo'ladi. Afinaliklar buni unutmaganlar va qachon qulayroq bo'lsa, Akropol ostida bu xudoga bag'ishlangan ma'bad qurganlar va 490 yildan buyon bu inqiroz davrida uning aralashuvi uchun qurbonliklar va o'yinlar o'tkazganlar. Shunga qaramay, afsonalar Marafon hisobiga kirdi, chunki u Ion urushi rekordida yo'q edi.

Pheidippides Spartaga Afinadan ketganidan yigirma to'rt soat o'tib keldi va Spartalik yordam so'rab murojaatida, Eretriya yaqinda vayron bo'lganini alohida qayd etdi. Bu epizodni 490 yilning yoz o'rtalarida bir necha kun ichida belgilaydi va haqiqatan ham Gerodotning ta'kidlashicha (Herodt. 6.102), forslar Evoyada bir necha kun qolishgan. Aytishlaricha, spartaliklar xushmuomala bo'lishgan, lekin o'z qonunlariga muvofiq va ular Karney bayramini nishonlashar ekan, oyning ettinchi va o'n beshinchi kunlari o'rtasida Karney (Afina Metageitnion oyi va taxminan avgust) Apollon sharafiga (Apollon Karney) ) va Pheidippides ularga murojaat qilgan to'qqizinchi kuni ular ittifoqchilariga qo'shilish uchun yana olti kun keta olmadilar. Pheidippides kelajakda yordam berishni va'da qilib qaytdi, lekin boshqa hech narsa yo'q. Yuguruvchining vazifasi, shuningdek, Afinada rejalashtirishning yo'qligi va ularning tayyorgarligini vaqtinchalik xususiyatini ochib beradi. Demokratiya institutlari, yaqinda Afinada ochilgan bo'lsa-da, tez qaror qabul qilishga to'sqinlik qildi. Afina mudofaasini rejalashtirish bir necha oy oldin osonlikcha amalga oshirilishi mumkin edi, ayniqsa afinaliklar forslardan qasos olishini bir necha yillar bilganlaridan beri. Shuningdek, ular Mardoniusning o'tgan yilgi kampaniyalarini o'tkazdilar, bunda Euxin savdo sheriklari bilan aloqalar buzilgan edi. Umuman olganda, qadimgi jamoalarning tashqi dunyoga miyopik munosabati antik davrda keng tarqalgan.

Ularning ketishining kechikishi diniy tamoyillarni sinchkovlik bilan kuzatilgani bilan bog'liq bo'lsa -da, spartaliklarning istamasligi ham siyosiy sabablarga asoslangan bo'lishi mumkin degan shubhalar bo'lishi mumkin. Shunday qilib, afinaliklar ham kechiktirildi, garchi umumiy fikr bo'lmasa ham. Bu yana o'nta generallar o'rtasidagi janjalni va, ehtimol, qo'mondon, pollimarx Kallimaxni (Herodt, 6.109), yaqin atrofda bo'lgan Afidna yaqinidagi qarama -qarshilikni tushuntirib beradi. Marafondan tog'larning boshqa tomoni. O'n birlari orasida uch yil oldin Chersonese'dan qochib ketgan va o'z lavozimlari va oilaviy tajribasi tufayli general lavozimini egallagan Miltiades ham bor edi. Herodotning yozishicha, Miltiades to'rtta general tomonidan qo'llab -quvvatlangan - eng yaxshi harakat - bu dushman bilan zudlik bilan aloqada bo'lish edi. This made some sense since the Athenians already held the higher ground and the Persians had to disembark.

The Athenians and their allies are said to have already encamped among the hills to the south of the bay. The Persians having rounded the northern headland, Cape Cynosura, into the bay of Marathon beached their enormous fleet, approximately two kilometres away from their enemy who must have been in full view of the attackers. Herodotus’ account is not coherent and some guesswork is needed to understand the events of the next few days. The Persians evidently disembarked and although the plain might have been suitable for employing cavalry units it would have taken a great deal of time to offload the horses and supplies and form them up into effective units. This will account for several days since not all the ships will have been able to beach at the same time and some complex schedule would have been enforced besides making an encampment for the troops and sending out foragers to meet all the needs of soldiers and animals alike.

The Athenians and their allies must have watched all these proceedings from their vantage point. The problem was one of waiting for the Spartans to arrive and thereby having battle-hardened troops among the front line. The Athenian citizen hoplites will have had very little recent experience of a battle, especially against a force that had obtained recent victories across the Aegean and on Euboea. Miltiades was the leading advocate, or so Herodotus claims, of an immediate engagement and this must be connected with not allowing the invaders to become comfortable in their new bridgehead. He persuaded Callimachus to vote against delaying any further and seems to have been concerned that some of the generals were secretly in contact with the Persians (Herodt. 6.109). It made good sense to catch the Persians and their allies unsettled and unprepared but there was also the adoption of some interesting strategy, attributed by modern scholars to Miltiades but in fact probably one that was discussed at length by the commanders, that of weakening the centre while adding extra troops to both wings of the army. This would result in the centre being deliberately allowed to withdraw in the face of superior weight from their opponents but also allowed the right and left wings of the army to rout their opposition and then sweep round to attack the enemy’s main concentration of troops from the rear.


“On to Richmond!”

Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, respectively, opposing commanders in the Overland Campaign.

The Army of the Potomac didn’t know quite what to make of Ulysses Grant. Modest to a fault, he was the inverse of peacocks like McClellan and Hooker, whose preening bombast belied their mediocrity, while his quiet decisiveness would prove the antidote to the hesitation that had characterized Meade’s lackluster leadership ever since Gettysburg. It wasn’t always thus. Until 1861, Grant was a study in failed promise: graduation from West Point followed by distinguished service in the Mexican War that petered out into dreary years of garrison duty, rumors of alcoholism, and a succession of unrewarding and unrewarded civilian trades in the backwaters of Missouri and Illinois. A Douglas Democrat in politics, he had harbored mixed feelings about slavery. The Civil War rescued him from obscurity, but unlike most it also rocketed him within months from victory to victory, beginning with the seizure of enemy posts on the Mississippi, the brilliant capture of Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee and the Cumberland, the stunning recovery from near-defeat at Shiloh, the triumph at Vicksburg, and the relief of Chattanooga.

Promising to bring a new aggressive spirit to the so often defeated eastern army, he called up spare troops from as far away as New York and Boston, and stripped the defenses of Washington to restore the Army of the Potomac to more than 120,000 men, its greatest size since 1862. “We had to have hard fighting,” Grant later wrote. “The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.” He retained Meade as the army’s nominal commander, although in practice the victor of Gettysburg served as something closer to a senior chief of staff for Grant, who planned the army’s movements. In contrast to his predecessors, Grant saw the Army of the Potomac’s overland campaign as but one piece, if the largest one, of a multi-pronged campaign to assault the Confederates simultaneously on every front. William T. Sherman, Grant’s successor as commander of the Army of the Tennessee, would strike for Atlanta, the Confederacy’s western manufacturing center and railroad hub. Gen. Nathaniel Banks would drive up the Red River into the heartland of Louisiana. A combined land and sea force would assault Mobile, the Confederacy’s last major port on the Gulf of Mexico. Yet another army under Gen. David Hunter would campaign down the Shenandoah Valley. And while Grant himself marched south into Virginia in pursuit of Robert E. Lee, Gen. Benjamin Butler with another 36,000 men would swing inland from Chesapeake Bay to envelop Richmond from the south. Altogether, it was the most comprehensive and coordinated war plan that the Union had yet attempted, and its complexity a testament to the strategic sophistication of Grant’s mind.

The Army of the Potomac in 1864 was no longer the battle-hungry and undisciplined mob that had stumbled into defeat at Bull Run three years earlier. It had been bloodied many times over since then. Most of the early volunteers were now dead or maimed, or had declined to reenlist after their three years were up. Although a steely patriotism, comradeship, and a determination to finish the job they had started all played their part, many of the veterans who still remained searched their souls for the strength to continue. One of them, Elwood Griest, a Pennsylvanian from Lancaster County, tried to explain to his wife how he coped with the pervasiveness of suffering and death. “I am more than ever convinced that life, strange and mysterious as it may seem to us, is but the sure and unerring workings of a grand machine, as much above our comprehension as the most complicated machinery of human invention is above the comprehension of brute creation. This being the case, we may go forward on life’s journey without fear, confident that whatever may happen, we are but contributing to the grand result.”

Along with veterans like Griest, tens of thousands of often unwilling draftees now filled the ranks. Even more were men who had been paid by affluent draftees to serve as hired substitutes. At the beginning of the war, bounties of $40 or $50 were common by 1864, it often cost more than $1,000 to entice men to enlist. Thaddeus Stevens personally offered a bounty of $150 to every man in the first two companies from Lancaster County to volunteer for twelve months’ service under the most recent Enrollment Act, plus a bonus of $50 for the first three companies whose officers pledged to abstain from liquor while in service. Apart from the standard $300 federal fee, many others were paid bounties by cities and towns, businesses and private donors such as Stevens, so that states could fill their draft quotas without resorting to politically risky mass conscription. Not surprisingly, many such men soon deserted and often reenlisted elsewhere to claim another bounty, and then absconded again: in one Connecticut regiment, 60 out of 210 recruits decamped within their first three days in camp. A satirical cartoon in Harper’s Weekly that winter showed a broker leading a weedy-looking drunk into a barber shop, saying, “Look a-here—I want you to trim up this old chap with a flaxen wig and a light mustache, so as to make him look like twenty and as I shall probably clear three hundred dollars on him, I sha’n’t mind giving you a fifty for the job.”

Once again, the Army of the Potomac crossed the desolation of northern Virginia, littered with abandoned fortifications, earthworks, old camps, rifle pits, burned bridges, wrecked railroad cars, ruined woodlands, and untilled fields. Even houses were scarce, having been torn apart for firewood by one army or another. On May 5, Grant collided with a Confederate army about half the size of his own near the old Chancellorsville battlefield, in the wasteland of scrub pine, briars, oak, swamps, and thickets known locally as the “Wilderness.” Human skulls and bones left from the former battle were strewn everywhere, a forbidding sight for men about to go into battle. Maneuver was close to impossible. The narrow roads jumbled ranks and the dense woods wiped out the Union’s advantage in artillery. For two days the armies grappled in bloody melees and fell in tangled heaps to devastating rifle fire from enemies hidden in the trees. Brushfires roasted hundreds of wounded alive, terrifying the living with their screams and the stink of burning flesh. The stalemate left more than seventeen thousand federals and eleven thousand Confederates killed, wounded, and captured. Several of Grant’s senior officers advised him to retreat as every thwarted commander before him had done. He ignored them. He directed the army to skirt Lee’s flank and keep marching south. Despite their wounds and their weariness, when the soldiers realized that Grant would not take them back to Washington, wild cheers echoed through the forest. Men swung their hats, flung up their arms, and cried, “On to Richmond!” with a gusto that they had not felt for many months.

On May 9, the two armies met again near Spotsylvania Court House, eight miles to the south. Grant hammered hard at the Confederate line but failed to break it. May 12 saw the longest sustained combat of the war, as for twenty-one hours straight soldiers battled only a few feet apart, standing atop the mingled dead and wounded three and four deep to poke their rifles over the breastworks, as the wounded writhed in agony beneath them. Wrote one federal soldier, “I saw one [man] completely trodden in the mud so as to look like part of it and yet he was breathing and gasping.” Federal losses at Spotsylvania surpassed 18,000, the Confederates’ somewhat less. Over just two weeks, the Army of the Potomac had been reduced by 36,000 men, more than a third of its number the Confederates were diminished by about 24,000, a slightly greater proportion of their total. Stymied but undefeated, Grant once again sidestepped the enemy’s position and pushed on south.

Northern newspapers barely mentioned the slaughter, instead emphasizing the skill of the generals and the bravery of the men. The Lancaster Examiner jauntily characterized Grant’s slog as “a footrace to Richmond,” and with a trumpeting boldface headline screamed—quite inaccurately—“Butler on the War Path! He is successful everywhere!” even as that hapless general succumbed to tactical paralysis. The soldiers, of course, knew the truth. The sheer bloodiness of the campaign traumatized even the most battle-hardened. Elwood Griest wrote to his wife, “What a ghastly spectacle do the dead present, torn and mutilated in every conceivable way their unburied corpses cover the country for miles and miles in every direction. I pray that I may be spared from seeing any more.” And in a scribbled note to his parents, future Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “It is still kill—kill—all the time,” adding a few days later, “I tell you many a man has gone crazy since this campaign has begun from the terrible pressure on mind & body.”

Only slowly did the magnitude of what was happening make itself felt in Washington. The atmosphere there became increasingly grim. “It is a tearful place here now,” wrote Rep. James A. Garfield to his wife from Washington. “While the thousands of fresh troops go out to feed the great battle mills the crushed grain comes in.” The wounded swamped field hospitals and piled up on train platforms and wharves. It got only worse. On June 3, in what Grant himself recognized as his worst mistake of the campaign, he ordered another frontal assault on Lee’s lines at Cold Harbor, ten miles east of Richmond. Veterans knew it was suicidal and wrote their names on scraps of paper so that their bodies could be identified later. Grant lost six thousand men that morning, more than half of them in the first half-hour, but failed again to dent Lee’s lines. When another assault was ordered that afternoon not a man stirred, refusing to commit suicide in what looked like a foregone massacre.

Grant realized that Cold Harbor was a watershed. Depleted, numb with exhaustion, shaken by trauma, and unwilling to attack dug-in Confederates, the Army of the Potomac was essentially fought-out. Since the beginning of the campaign, it had lost some 55,000 men, of whom more than 7,000 had been killed. A single division in the Second Corps had suffered the appalling loss of 72 percent of its strength since the campaign began. The Confederates had lost between 30,000 and 35,000, many of them irreplaceable.

Apart from Adm. David Farragut’s dramatic seizure of Mobile—“Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead,” he famously cried as he ordered his warships into the heavily mined bay—all the other pieces of Grant’s ambitious strategy had come to naught. Hunter had been driven ignominiously from the Shenandoah Valley. Butler had allowed himself to be bottled up by a much smaller enemy force outside Petersburg. Sherman was still maneuvering toward Atlanta. Banks had been thrown back in Louisiana. Grant had brought Lee to bay in the ring of fortified trenches around Richmond and Petersburg, but the Confederates still held their capital, and they were still willing to fight. Yet another year that had begun with high hopes and another celebrated general seemed to be sinking into torpid stalemate.

In Washington, as renewed public disillusionment with the war set in, tempers were on a hair-trigger. Zachariah Chandler, Ben Wade’s rough-mannered Senate colleague from Michigan, was dining with friends at the National Hotel on Pennsylvania Avenue when he was overheard denouncing Copperheads by Rep. Daniel Voorhees of Indiana, who was sitting nearby. Voorhees rose, stepped closer to Chandler, and slapped him in the face. The two, both big men—Voorhees was known as “The Tall Sycamore of the Wabash”—then began wrestling across the dining room. When Chandler appeared to be getting the better of Voorhees, the Indianan’s companion, a man named Hannigan, rushed to his aid. Seizing a pitcher of milk from a nearby table, he smashed it over Chandler’s head, spraying milk over everyone nearby and leaving Chandler stunned. Hannigan then hit him again with a chair, at which point the men were finally separated, with great difficulty, by bystanders. It was a foretaste of the political campaign that was just getting under way.

In Congress, Elihu Washburne of Illinois rose to deliver a paean of thanks to the soldiers of the Union. Precisely a year to the day, July 3 1864, had passed, he said, since the armies of the North and South had grappled at Gettysburg. Yes, many men and much matériel had been lost since then. But federal arms were triumphant from Arkansas to Virginia. Sherman was just eighteen miles from Atlanta, “the great rebel heart of the Southwest.” And Lee? Two months ago he had confronted the federal army on the Rapidan with “one hundred and thirty thousand of the best soldiers of the bogus confederacy.” (This was a considerable exaggeration, but no one corrected him.) Two months later, Washburne went on, General Grant—“that child of victory”—had now “driven the desperate and maddened hordes of Lee through sixty miles of his intrenchments, outgeneraling him in every movement, and beating him in every battle. He now holds both Petersburg and Richmond by the throat.” (This was another exaggeration.) The entire military situation never looked more promising, he claimed. “Returning to our seats on the 1st of December, as I hope we all may, I trust we shall see the rebellion crushed, peace restored, and the country regenerated and disenthralled.”


Darius

Darius was determined to subjagate the Greeks. He planned to punish the Athenians and reinstall the deposed tyrant Hippias. Hippias informed him that the Alcmaeonidae, an important Athenian family, were opposed to Miltiades and prepared to assist in his restoration if the Athenian army could be drawn out of the city, Hippias asured Darious tht Athens under his rule would accept Persian control. This was the basic approach in the Persian Empire to support or impose a local leader which they could control. This seemed a perfect opportunity to defeat the Athenians thus weakening the Greek alliance. He reasoned that subjecting Sparta and the other Greeks would be much easier once the Athenians were disposed of.


Before the Persian Wars Datis was a Persian commander during the Ionian Revolt. Datis would lead the counter-offensive against the Ionians during the revolt in 494 BCE. [2]

Datis and another officer named Artaphernes replaced a commander named Mardonius. Datis was ordered to reduce Athens and Eretria to slavery, and bring the slaves before the kings. The goal of Datis' campaign was to establish a bridgehead in the eastern coast of Greece.

In 490 BCE, Datis sailed of the Ionian shoreline to Samos, and then he traveled eastward through the Icarian sea to the islands of Delos and Naxos. [3] When Datis arrived the inhabitants of the islands fled. Datis then sent the inhabitants a message telling them he would never harm the islands. Datis would also burn large amounts of incense at the altar of Apollo. This piece of propaganda resulted in the Oracle of Delphi becoming a mouthpiece for Persian propaganda. [4]

Datis traveled across Greece taking town after town for the Persian Empire. One town named Carystus resisted Datis. Because of this Datis laid siege to the city. Datis began the siege by destroying the crops around the city. Datis' army of 80,000 soldiers with 200 triremes overwhelmed the city causing Carystus to surrender. [4] [5]

During Datis's siege of Eretria in 490 BCE, the Eretrians had many conflicting strategies. Some Eretrians wished to surrender the city and wage guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Greece. Some Eretrians wanted to betray the city to the Persians. 4,000 Athenian colonists came from Chalcis to defend Eretria. Datis attacked the Eretrians in battle, resulting in severe casualties. On the seventh day of the siege the Eretrians surrendered, and all of the temples in the city were burned to enact revenge on the burning of Sardis. [4] It is very likely one of the temples destroyed was the temple of Apollo Daphnephoros. [6]

He would also command the Persian assault force on the Athenians at the Battle of Marathon in the same year. Ctesias of Cnidus relates that Datis was slain at Marathon and that the Athenians refused to hand over his body, [7] however this conflicts with Herodotus' earlier claim that Datis survived the battle [8]

If Datis survived the battle of Marathon he would have returned to Asia and returned the statue of Apollo to Delos and he would have taken his Eretrian slaves to Susa. [8]

An Athenian statesman named Aristides was accused of being the brother of Datis. [6] Datis also had several sons named Harmamithres and Tithaeus. Both of his children would become cavalry officers under Xerxes I. [8]

  1. ^ abhttp://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/datis
  2. ^ Souza, Philip de (2004). The Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC. Taylor & Francis. ISBN978-113-588-209-9 .
  3. ^
  4. McNab, Chris (2018). Greek Hoplite Vs Persian Warrior: 499–479 BC. Bloomsbury nashriyoti. ISBN978-147-282-573-5 .
  5. ^ abv
  6. Green, Peter (1996). The Greco-Persian Wars. California: University of California Press. ISBN978-052-091-706-4 .
  7. ^
  8. Shirley, Samuel (2003). On the War for Greek Freedom: Selections from The Histories. Hackett Publishing Company, Incorporated. ISBN978-160-384-679-0 .
  9. ^ ab
  10. Garland, Robert. Athens Burning: The Persian Invasion of Greece and the Evacuation of Attica. Jon Xopkins universiteti matbuoti. ISBN978-142-142-195-7 .
  11. ^Photius the Great, Excerpts of Ctesias' "Persica", Paragraph 22, available online at https://www.livius.org/ct-cz/ctesias/photius_persica.html
  12. ^ abv Herodotus, Histories

This Middle Eastern biographical article related to the military is a stub. Siz Vikipediyani kengaytirish orqali unga yordam bera olasiz.

This Ancient Near East biographical article is a stub. Siz Vikipediyani kengaytirish orqali unga yordam bera olasiz.


Essay On Athens Vs Sparta

Athens left an everlasting effect on the world, while Sparta did not. This essay will prove that Athens is the better polis. Athens and Sparta were very similar in many ways but they had one major difference that divided them in history, government. Spartans focused mainly on developing their military while Athenians focused on developing a better form of government. Sparta was ruled by two kings who believed that military was the most important factor in life.&hellip


6. Wars against Persia

War with the Persians continued. In 460 BC, Egypt revolted under local leaders the Hellenes called Inaros and Amyrtaeus, who requested aid from Athens. Pericles led 250 ships, intended to attack Cyprus, to their aid because it would further damage Persia. After four years, however, the Egyptian rebellion was defeated by the Achaemenid general Megabyzus, who captured the greater part of the Athenian forces. In fact, according to Isocrates, the Athenians and their allies lost some 20.000 men in the expedition, while modern estimates place the figure at 50.000 men and 250 ships including reinforcements. The remainder escaped to Cyrene and thence returned home.

This was the Athenians main public reason for moving the treasury of the League from Delos to Athens, further consolidating their control over the League. The Persians followed up their victory by sending a fleet to re-establish their control over Cyprus, and 200 ships were sent out to counter them under Cimon, who returned from ostracism in 451 BC. He died during the blockade of Citium, though the fleet won a double victory by land and sea over the Persians off Salamis, Cyprus.

This battle was the last major one fought against the Persians. Many writers report that a peace treaty, known as the Peace of Callias, was formalized in 450 BC, but some writers believe that the treaty was a myth created later to inflate the stature of Athens. However, an understanding was definitely reached, enabling the Athenians to focus their attention on events in Greece proper.


Thoughts on the Battle of Marathon, 490 BC

This entry was posted on November 29, 2014 by Josho Brouwers .

Last Wednesday, I gave a lecture, for which I had been invited, at the University of Ghent in Belgium on the Battle of Marathon. The lecture was the second in a series on battles in Greece from earliest times to the modern age and I was specifically asked to touch upon an Archaic or Classical battle. A paper version of my talk will be published in the institute’s yearly journal, Tetradio, in 2016. The text will be in Dutch, but it will also include an English summary.

When originally asked to give a lecture, I first picked the Battle of Thermopylae as my topic. But as I was working on that, I realized I could never fit what I wanted to say about it in the span of a 60 to 75-minute talk. There’s just too much ground to cover. Instead, Marathon struck me as the ideal topic: a single battle, often considered one of history’s defining moments, which serves as a good introduction to the Persian Wars as a whole.

The title of my lecture can be translated as “The miracle of Marathon? The Athenian victory over the Persians in 490 BC”. The lecture was divided into four major parts, followed by a conclusion. In the first part, I focused on the sources for the battle. The single major source is, of course, Herodotus. But other authors also wrote about Marathon, though never in as much detail as he did, and they can offer interesting additional information. Aside from written texts, there’s also plenty of other material that we can draw upon: vase-paintings (nearly all from Athens or at least Attica), and an array of archaeological data (particularly the remains of the dead on the battlefield itself).

The road to Marathon

The second part of my lecture was a summary of the road to Marathon. I briefly discussed the rise of the Persian Empire – the largest empire the ancient world had yet seen, which was only a little over half a century old when the Athenians fought some of its armed forces at Marathon. Naturally, I gave a brief overview of the political situation in Greece, and the fact that Athens, in 507/506, gave earth and water to Persia and forged an alliance. They would betray this alliance later by lending support to the Greeks in Asia Minor during the Ionian Revolts, which were crushed by Persia in 493 BC.

Herodotus presents Marathon as a punitive expedition, but this seems doubtful. To the Persians, Athens had indeed betrayed their trust. But Athens was relatively insignificant in the grand scheme of things. Persian inscriptions, in which the extent of the Empire is described, present the Aegean and its peoples as existing on the very fringe, and relatively unimportant. All Persia seemed to care for, was that its borders were stable. Adding territory was a good way for a king to increase his prestige, which explains Darius’ forays into the lands of the Scythians, Thracians, and indeed Greeks.

But the Battle of Marathon was the final stop in a Persian campaign to domesticate the unruly Greeks. Datis and Artaphernes were placed at the head of an expedition that conquered various Aegean islands, subdued Carystus on Euboea, besieged Eretria (and deported its inhabitants), before landing at Marathon, where the Persians spent several days raiding the countryside with little opposition.

The actual battle

The actual battle was the subject of the third part of my lecture. The Athenians had marched out and were joined by a small force of Plataeans. Herodotus doesn’t give any numbers later sources claim that the Greek army consisted of 9,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataeans. The Spartans were asked for help, but were unable to come. Herodotus comes across as puzzled, and the statement he gives suggests religious reasons Plato would later suggest that the Spartans had first to deal with a revolt among their Messenian helots. Eventually, the Athenian general Miltiades managed to convince the polemarch Callimachus to attack the Persians, perhaps when the latter were on the verge of leaving. They famously broke into a run – when exactly, how fast they ran or for how long, nobody knows for certain – and attacked the Persian forces. The fighting was long and hard, but the Athenians were victorious.

The Battle of Marathon is an excellent case study, as it shows just how little we know, despite having such good source like Herodotus. Many details are unclear. Did Miltiades plan everything out in detail, including the famous pincer movement that crushed the Persian forces? Or did the Athenians win through sheer luck? How many men fought? Herodotus only says that the Persians had a fleet of 600 ships. The 192 Athenian dead and 11 Plataeans are probably exact figures, since their names were recorded in stone, but the number of 6,400 dead for the Persians strikes as false: 6,400 is 33.33 times 192, rounded up.

The importance of Marathon

The fourth and final part of my lecture was on the importance of Marathon. Some claim that Marathon was of central importance not just to Athenian or Greek history, but to Western history as a whole. That’s a bold statement, for which authors generally have no proof. I spent some time dissecting this fallacy, going back to the days of Meyer and Weber, briefly revisiting my earlier criticism of such work as Victor Davis Hanson’s The Western Way of War, before citing Robert Graves’s poem, The Persian Version, as an antidote to overly high appraisals of the Battle of Marathon.

The victory at Marathon was, on the whole, rather unimportant to the Persians. If they had won, they would have installed Hippias, the tyrant who had been expelled from Athens in 510, as ruler of Athens, but his reign would probably have been short-lived, anyway. The Persians did not have the numbers to press an attack on the rest of Greece. Instead, Marathon was important only for the Athenians: it showed to them that they could not only defeat the Achaemenid Empire, but could even do so without the help of the Spartans, who arrived after the battle was already over and could do nothing but congratulate the victors.

The talk went smoothly and I got some good questions afterwards not everyone was convinced that the battle was as unimportant in the grand scheme of things as I suggested it was, which is always a yaxshi sign. I’d like to thank the people from the university’s “Griekenlandcentrum” for inviting me. Berenice Verhelst took good care of me, Gunnar de Boel gave a great introduction to my talk, and Pieter Borghart was swift in emailing me the necessary guidelines as regards the paper version of this lecture for publication in Tetradio. If you are ever in Ghent and the institute organizes another lecture, be sure to attend.

I am currently working on a review article about recent books on Marathon, to be published on the website of the UNRV sometime in the very near future, with recommendations. As far as books on the battle are concerned, I would be remiss if I didn’t point you to the Ancient Warfare special that was published in 2011, exactly 2500 years after the battle was fought. I am also planning to write a book on the Persian Wars, hopefully for publication in 2016 or 2017 (probably in Dutch), so I will undoubtedly revisit the topic in future blog posts.

Tegishli xabarlar:

This entry was posted in Uncategorized on November 29, 2014 by Josho Brouwers . &larr Previous Post Next Post &rarr


Peloponnesian War Causes

Two separate alliances emerged from the disbanded Hellenic League, the restored Peloponnesian League which consisted of Sparta and many main-land Greece city-states, and the Athenian’s Delian League. The Delian League was a force of Greek-City states whose goal was to continue the fight against the Persians by conquering the Persian’s colonies and adding them to their empire. With the founding of the Delian League the remaining Persians and their colonies were quickly and easily defeated. The quick and forceful rise of the Athenian Empire and their Delian League caused many Greek-city states to fear the Athenians and their naval capabilities. As the Athenian historian Thucydides said, “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable”.&hellip


Siege of Carystus, 490 BC - History

People - Ancient Greece : Hippias

Hippias (tyrant) in Wikipedia Hippias of Athens (Ancient Greek: Ἱππίας ὁ Ἀθηναῖος) was one of the sons of Peisistratus, and was tyrant of Athens in the 6th century BC. Hippias succeeded Peisistratus in 527 BC, and in 525 BC he introduced a new system of coinage in Athens. His brother Hipparchus, who may have ruled jointly with him, was murdered by Harmodius and Aristogeiton (the Tyrannicides) in 514 BC. Hippias executed the Tyrannicides and became a bitter and cruel ruler. The Alcmaeonidae family, who Peisistratus had exiled in 546 BC, had built a new temple at Delphi, then bribed the priestess to command the Spartans to help them overthrow Hippias. A Spartan force under Anchimolius was sent to help, but Hippias and his family, the Pisistratidae, allied themselves with Cineas of Thessaly, and the Spartans and Alcmaeonidae were at first defeated. A second attempt, led by Cleomenes I of Sparta, successfully entered Athens and trapped Hippias on the Acropolis. They also took the Pisistratidae children hostage, and Hippias was forced to leave Athens in order to have them returned safely. He was expelled from Athens in 510. Shortly before the end of his rule, he married his daughter, Archedike, to Aiantides, son of Hippoklos, the tyrant of Lampsakos, to facilitate his access to Darius' court at Susa.[1] The Spartans later thought that a free, democratic Athens would be dangerous to Spartan power, and attempted to recall Hippias and reestablish the tyranny. Hippias had fled to Persia, and the Persians threatened to attack Athens if they did not accept Hippias nevertheless the Athenians preferred to remain democratic despite the danger from Persia. Soon after this, the Ionian Revolt began. It was put down in 494 BC, but Darius I of Persia was intent on punishing Athens for their role in the revolt. In 490 BC Hippias, still in the service of the Persians, led Darius to Marathon, Greece. According to Herodotus, Hippias had a dream that the Persians would be defeated, and they in fact were defeated at the Battle of Marathon although many historical texts believe that Hippias saw many omens for victory on both sides.

Hippias in Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities A Greek sophist of Elis and a contemporary of Socrates. He taught in the towns of Greece, especially at Athens. He had the advantage of a prodigious memory, and was deeply versed in all the learning of his day. He attempted literature in every form which was then extant. He was among the first to undertake the composition of dialogues. In the two Platonic dialogues named after him (Hippias Maior and Hippias Minor), he is represented as excessively vain and arrogant. See the study by Osann in the Rhein. Museum for 1843, p. 495 foll., and P. Leja, Der Sophist Hippias (1893). 2. A son of Pisistratus. See Pisistratidae.


Videoni tomosha qiling: 18+ Дикие племена Африки. ГОЛОЕ племя Химба. НАМИБИЯ. Реальная АФРИКА. (Yanvar 2022).