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Iroq va Transjordaniya xoshimiy podshohlari begona hisoblanganmi?

Iroq va Transjordaniya xoshimiy podshohlari begona hisoblanganmi?

Inglizlar Birinchi jahon urushidan keyin Transjordaniya va Iroqning yangi siyosiy tuzilmalariga hukmronlik qildilar. Ularning ikkalasi ham ular boshqargan hududda emas, Hijozda (hozir G'arbiy Saudiya Arabistonida) tug'ilgan. Boshqa tomondan, bugungi kunda bu hududlar orasidagi siyosiy tafovut 20 -asrning boshlarida bo'lmagan.

Savol: Husayn bin Alining o'g'illari o'zlari boshqargan odamlar tomonidan qanchalik chet elliklar sifatida ko'rilgan va bu tuyg'u mahalliy siyosatda o'zini namoyon qilganmi?


O'sha paytda arab dunyosida panarabizm modada edi. Bu hukmdorlarning Islom payg'ambarining qabilasiga qaytgan nasllari ortiqcha edi.

Arab davlatlari bir nechta muvaffaqiyatsiz loyihalarda birlashishga harakat qilishdi. Siz qayerdan kelganligingiz, qanday siyosiy aqidaga ega bo'lishingiz muhim emas edi.


Men javob beraman va savolga shunday javob beraman: "Birinchi jahon urushidan keyin inglizlar Transjordaniya va Iroqqa yuklagan xoshim podshohlari qanchalik yaxshi qabul qilingan?" Chunki javoblar boshqacha.

"Iordaniya" ning hozirgi qiroli Abdulla II. U marhum (va mashhur) shoh Husaynning o'g'li. Husayn inglizlar o'sha paytdagi "Transjordan" da taxtga o'tirgan ikki aka -ukadan biri (Ali bilan birga) Abdulla I ning nabirasi edi. Hoshimiylar deyarli 100 yil va to'rt avlod davomida zamonaviy Iordaniyani doimiy ravishda boshqarib borganlar. Transjordaniyaliklar boshida ular haqida qanday shubha -gumonlar yo'qolib ketgan bo'lsa. (Qirol Abdulla I ni "o'rnatgan" Britaniya ta'siri uzoq vaqtdan beri yo'q bo'lib ketgan, shuning uchun o'shandan beri bo'lgan voqealar "tabiiy").

"Transplantatsiya Iroqda deyarli unchalik samara bermadi. Bu mamlakat jahon urushlari o'rtasida bir qancha hukumatlarni boshidan kechirdi, shu jumladan natsistlarni qo'llab-quvvatlovchi hukumat. Ikkinchi jahon urushidan keyin xoshimiylar cheklangan muvaffaqiyat bilan Iroqda hokimiyatni qaytarishga harakat qilishdi. 1958 yilda Iroq (Hoshimiy) monarxi Iordaniya qiroli Husaynga ikki davlat o'z monarxiyalarini Misr-Suriya Birlashgan Arab Respublikasiga qarshi vazn sifatida birlashtirishni taklif qildi. Bu Iroq monarxini ag'dargan iroq millatchisi Qosim boshchiligidagi to'ntarish bilan kutib olindi. ( U o'z navbatida 1963 yilda Baas partiyasi tomonidan ag'darilgan edi.)

Iroqda xoshimiylarni qo'llab -quvvatlaydigan guruh umuman yo'q edi. Albatta, shia musulmonlari emas (xoshimiylar - sunniylar), shuningdek, sunniylar bilan bir xil bo'lgan, lekin o'z kun tartibiga ega bo'lgan kurdlar. Faqat inglizlarning qo'llab -quvvatlashi monarxiyani Iroqda bo'lgani kabi davom ettirishga imkon berdi.

Shunday qilib, men aytardimki, Hoshim podshohlari Iroqda Transjordanga qaraganda ancha "begona" deb hisoblangan.


Cherchill Transjordanni Falastindan ajratganida

1916 yilgi Sayk-Piko kelishuvi Frantsiya (Livan va Suriya) va Buyuk Britaniya (Falastin va Iroq) uchun mandatlar belgilashni nazarda tutgan. Usmoniylarni mag'lub etishdagi yordami uchun mukofot sifatida Hoshimiylar sulolasidan Sharif Husaynning o'g'li inglizlar tomonidan Suriya hukmdori sifatida o'rnatildi. Biroq, frantsuzlar uni 1921 yilda quvib chiqarishdi va inglizlar keyingi yil Isoga Faysal bin Husaynni podshoh qilib berishdi.

Hoshimiylar ilgari hozirgi Saudiya Arabistoni bo'lgan Xijazdan quvilgan edi va saudiylar ko'p yillar davomida vatanga hukmron vahhobiylarni qaytarib, quvib chiqarishga urinishdan qo'rqishadi.

Frank Jeykobsning so'zlariga ko'ra, & ldquoFaisal bin Husayn Suriyadagi akasi Abdullohga yordam berish uchun ketayotganida, Uinston Cherchill frantsuzlarning mag'lubiyatga uchrashidan tayoq, Abdulloh va o'z sulolasining sabzi kabi va'da qilib, undan qochishni so'ragan. & rdquo

Uinston Cherchill 1921 yilda Qohirada yakshanba kuni tushdan keyin qalamning zarbasi bilan Buyuk Britaniyaning Transjordaniya mandatini yaratganini aytdi, hozir Iordaniya Qirolligi. Ko'rinib turibdiki, o'sha kuni ichganidan so'ng, mustamlakachi kotibning qalamkashligi, ayniqsa, tartibsiz chegara chizig'ini ishlab chiqarardi.

& ldquoBritaniya va rdquo Jeykobsning yozishmalariga ko'ra, Transjordan va Ldquosaw transdordan va rsquos asosan Falastin va Iroq o'rtasidagi tranzit zonasi sifatida, shuningdek, Britaniya va Hindiston o'rtasidagi havo yo'lakining bir qismi sifatida (parvozlar nisbatan qisqa bo'lgan va yonilg'i quyish paytida). & rdquo Sharqning joylashuvi. Transjordaniya va Iroq o'rtasidagi chegara, shuningdek, Kerkuk va Nash -Hayfa neft quvurini qurish taklifi bilan bog'liq.

Iordan daryosining sharqiy qirg'og'ida joylashganligi sababli Transjordan 1920 yilda San-Remo konferentsiyasida Buyuk Britaniyaning Falastin mandatining bir qismi bo'lgan. Bu mandat Balfur deklaratsiyasini tan olgan edi. uy butun Falastinda yaratiladi.

1921 yil 12 martda Qohirada bo'lib o'tgan Yaqin Sharq konferentsiyasi chaqirilishidan oldin yozilgan Transjordaniya haqidagi eslatma Buyuk Britaniyaning asl mandatni o'zgartirish haqidagi qarorini tushuntiradi:

1921 yil 12 martda Cherchill mustamlakachilar idorasiga telegramma yubordi:

Koloniya idorasi shunday javob berdi:

& ldquoBu mandatdagi hech narsa, Mesopotamiyaning shimoliy qismidagi kurdlar istiqomat qiladigan hududlar uchun avtonom mintaqaviy boshqaruv tizimini o'rnatishga majbur qilmaydi, deb o'ylaydi.

Iordaniya bilan Falastinning sharqiy chegarasi oralig'ida joylashgan hududlarda, majburiy, agar mavjud mahalliy sharoitga mos kelmasa, ushbu mandatning qoidalarini kechiktirish yoki to'xtatib qo'yish huquqiga ega. 15, 16 va 18 -moddalarning qoidalariga zid bo'lgan hech qanday choralar ko'rilmasligi sharti bilan, hududlarni boshqarish uchun.

Abdulloh uchun shohlikni yaratish uchun, Cherchill & rsquos & lldquostroke of pen & rdquo, Transjordanni, Falastinning taxminan to'rtdan uch qismini 1920 yilda San-Remoda tashkil etilgan Buyuk Britaniyaning asl mandatidan ajratdi. Cherchill va Abdulla keyinchalik Transjordaniya majburiy hudud sifatida qabul qilinishiga kelishib oldilar. Falastindan tashqari arab mamlakati va Iordan daryosining g'arbiy qismida joylashgan yahudiylarning milliy uyi tarkibiga kirmaydi. Abdulla 1921 yil aprelda Transjordaniya viloyatining amiri etib tayinlandi. Buyuk Britaniya Iordan daryosining g'arbiy qismini Falastin, Iordanning sharqiy qismini esa Transjordaniya sifatida boshqardi.

1922 yil avgustda Britaniya hukumati Millatlar Ligasiga Memorandumni taqdim etdi, unda Transjordaniya yahudiylarning joylashuvi bilan bog'liq barcha qoidalardan chetlatiladi va bu memorandum Liga tomonidan 12 avgustda ma'qullangan. bo'lajak yahudiy davlati uchun mavjud bo'lgan maydon, ular butun Falastinni, ya'ni Iordan daryosining ikkala qirg'og'ini qamrab olishi kutilgan edi.

Qizig'i shundaki, 1917 yilda Lord Valter Rotshildga yozgan xati yahudiylarga Falastindagi milliy uyni va'da qilgan lord Artur Balfur edi, u 1922 yil 16 sentyabrda Ligaga Buyuk Britaniya Transjordanni tark etish uchun mandatni o'zgartirishni xohlaganini aytdi. Iordaniya g'arbidagi yahudiylar uchun milliy uy -joy ajratish uchun mo'ljallangan maydon.


Uchrashuvda Falastin masalasi muhokama qilingan daqiqalar
Millatlar Ligasi (1922 yil 16 sentyabr) - Kattalashtirish uchun grafikani bosing

Keyinchalik Britaniya hukumati tomonidan 1936 yildagi arab qo'zg'olonlarining sabablarini o'rganish uchun tayinlangan Peel komissiyasi, Balfur deklaratsiyasi vaqtida butun tarixiy Falastinda, shu jumladan, yahudiylarning milliy uyi tashkil etilishi tushunilganligini yozdi. Transjordaniya.

1946 yil 17 -iyunda Transjordaniya mustaqil davlatga aylandi.

Qirol Abdulloh 1948 yilda G'arbiy Sohilni qo'shib olgach, mamlakat Iordaniya deb o'zgartirildi.

Manbalar: Iordaniya Qirolligi
Frank Jeykobs, & ldquoWinston & rsquos Hik, & rdquo New York Times, (2012 yil 6 -mart)
& ldquoEmjirlik Transjordaniya, & rdquo Vikipediya
Maurice Ostroff, & Ldquo 1967 yildagi xarita Isroilning kelajakdagi chegaralari uchun 1920 yildagi xaritaga qaraganda kamroq ahamiyatga ega. Jerusalem Post, (2014 yil 31 mart).

Yahudiy virtual kutubxonasiga kirish uchun mobil ilovamizni yuklab oling


Virtual yahudiy dunyosi: Transjordan

Geografik jihatdan Transjordaniya (Ibroncha עֵבֶרהַיַרְדֵּן) Iordan daryosining sharqidagi, Xermon yaqinidagi Iordan manbalaridan O'lik dengizgacha cho'zilgan hududni o'z ichiga oladi. Biroq, Yarmuk daryosining shimolidagi hudud (Golan va Bashan) alohida mavjudot sifatida qaraladi, O'lik dengiz va Arabaning sharqiy qismi, Qizil dengizgacha, Transjordaniya hududiga kiradi.

O'zining geografik konfiguratsiyasida Transjordaniya shimoldan janubga cho'zilgan uchta mintaqadan iborat: sharqiy Iordan vodiysining vodiyga tushadigan yonbag'irlari, g'arbga qaragan, yomg'ir bilan yaxshi ta'minlangan va tog'lar, sharqqa yumshoq va birlashgan tog '. cho'l dasht. Bu hududning turg'un qismi 6840 kv. (17,500 kv. Km.), Undan Iordan-O'lik dengiz cho'kmasi 215 kv. (550 kv. Km.), Tog 'va tepalik mintaqasi 2,617 kv. (6700 kv. Km.), Baland plato 2.051 kv. (5,250 kv. Km.), Va qumli janubiy viloyatlar taxminan 1,953 kv. (taxminan 5000 kv. km.). Siyosiy nuqtai nazardan, Iordaniya Hoshimiylar Qirolligida Transjordaniya hududi 28320 kv. (72,500 kv. Km.) Dasht va cho'l keng Iroqqa qo'shilib, Suriyani Saudiya-Arabistonidan ajratib turadi.

Turar joyni Iordanning sharqdan g'arbga oqadigan joylari va O'lik dengizga quyiladigan daryolar kesib tashlaydi: Yarmuk, Gabbadni Ammondan va Nimrin Pereyasidan ajratib, Jabbokni shimoliy chegarasini tashkil qiladi. Mo'abning shimoliy chegarasi Arnon, ba'zi paytlarda Mo'abni Edom va Seir tog'laridan ajratib turuvchi Zerab Mo'ab chegarasi. Sharqda Iordanga parallel bo'lgan tog 'tizmasi balandligi bilan farq qiladi: Ajlin (Gilad) da, Ibn Ibnning balandligi 1182 m., Umm al-Daraj 4203 fut (1261 m.) Balandlikda va Qal'at Ilyosning balandligi 3,940 m. Jabbokdan janubda, Nabi Yushaʿ 3,710 fut (1,113 m) ga etadi va Nebo tog'i Arnondan janubga 2,650 fut (795 m.) Balandlikda, Jebel Sihan balandligi 3,550 fut (1,065 m) va Jebel al- Hasan - balandligi 1,234 m., Seir tog'lari 5,776 futga (1,733 m.) Etadi. Eng ko'p yog'ingarchilik Ajlūnda (taxminan 700 mm. 700 mm.) Va Seir tog'larida (taxminan 15 va frac34 in. 400 mm.). Ekin maydonlarining katta qismi har yili taxminan 8 dyuym (200 mm.) Oladi, yomg'ir cho'lda taxminan 3 dyuym (80 mm.) Yog'adi. Gilad tog'lari qadim zamonlardan beri o'rmonli bo'lib kelmoqda, bu hudud ancha qalinroq o'rmon bilan qoplangan edi, buni Absalom haqidagi hikoya ham tasdiqlaydi. Ekin ekiladigan katta maydon sharqqa cho'zilgani haqida dalillar bor. Jerash yaqinida temir va Arabada mis qazilgan (qarang Punon).

Tarix

Paleolit ​​va mezolit qoldiqlari, Transjordaniyadagi birinchi ishg'ol izlari Seir tog'larida va Vadi Nimrinda topilgan. O'lik dengizning janubi-sharqidagi al-Bayḍa atda keramikadan oldingi neolit ​​turar joyi topilgan. Iordan vodiysidagi Alfa Safat va al-Udayma shaharlarida megalitik qurilishlar topilgan. Oxirgi sayt yaqinida Tulaylat al-Gassol joylashgan bo'lib, u katta ahamiyatga ega bo'lgan xalkolit davri bo'lib, u o'z nomini Gassulian madaniyatiga qo'ydi. Erta bronza davridan boshlab, N. Glyuk tomonidan olib borilgan arxeologik tadqiqotlar natijasida, asosan Transjordaniyaning janubiy qismida, ma'lum bir kasb -hunar modelini kuzatish mumkin: turar -joy davrlari bu hudud tashlab ketilgan davrlar bilan farq qilgan. ko'chmanchilar

Birinchi joylashish davri taxminan 23 -asrdan 19 -asrgacha davom etgan Miloddan avvalgi Injil an'analariga ko'ra, erta aholi Giladning shimolidagi Xamdagi zuzimlarni, Mo'abdagi Emimlarni va Seir tog'idagi Horitlarni o'z ichiga olgan (Ibt. 14: 5 va ndash6). Ehtimol, bu bobda tasvirlangan bosqinchilik natijasida Transjordaniya aholi punktining 19 -asrdan taxminan 14 -asrgacha pasayishi kuzatilgan. Miloddan avvalgi Misr matnlarida Iordan vodiysidagi shaharlardan tashqari, Transjordaniya shaharlari haqida shu vaqt ichida hech narsa aytilmagan: Pehel (Pella Execration Texts, Thutmosis III va Seti Men) va ehtimol Zafon (al-Amarna harflarini aytib bering), Zarethan (Execration matnlari) va Kiriath Anab (Yarmuk Seti haqida al-Shihobga ayting) Men, Papirus Anastasi Men). Faqat 13 -asrda, Ramses yozuvlarida II, Mo'abdagi shaharlar, jumladan Dibon, birinchi marta tilga olingan. Misrning Kan'on viloyatining bibliyadagi ta'rifi (34 -son) Shasu ko'chmanchilariga qoldirilgan Transjordanni aniq istisno qiladi.

Chiqishdan taxminan bir asr oldin, Transjordan ammonliklar, mo'abitlar va edomitlar tomonidan qayta o'rnatildi, ular kuchli qirollik zanjirini yaratdi, ular keng maydonlar va samarali chegara qal'alari tizimiga ega edi. Ehtimol, 13 -asrning boshlarida Moabga shimoldan Xeshbon shohi amor shohi Sixon hujum qilgan va u Arnon shimolidagi hududni tortib olgan. Sahrodan kelgan isroilliklar Transjordanni kesib o'tishni juda qiyin deb bilishdi va nihoyat, ular Mo'ab va Edom shaharlari sharqidan o'tib, Sixon ustidan qozongan g'alabalari ularga butun Iordan vodiysi, Gilad va Mo'abning bir qismini berdi. Bu hudud Ruben (Arnondan Nimrin vodiysigacha), Gad (janubiy Giladdan Jabbok va Iordan vodiysigacha) qabilalari va Manasse yarmi (shimoldagi Jabbokdan) qabilalariga ajratilgan.

Hukmdorlar davrida bu qabilalar Ammon va Mo'ab shohlariga bo'ysunishdi, toki Dovud oxirigacha Qizil dengizgacha Transjordanni bosib oldi. Sulaymon davrida, Isroil nazorati ostidagi Transjordan, Ramot-Gilad, Mahanayim va Gilad janubining uchta tumaniga bo'lingan (Gad Men Shohlar 4:13 va ndash14, 19). Shohlik bo'linib bo'lgach, Ommon va Mo'ab Isroilga, Edom esa Yahudoga o'tdi, lekin tez orada uchalasi ham mustaqillikka erishdilar. Mesha stelidan ma'lumki, Mo'ab Omri tomonidan qayta qo'lga kiritildi, u Axab davrida Isroilga qarshi qo'zg'olon ko'tardi va nihoyat, Omrid shohlarining oxirgi a'zosi Yoram davrida mustaqillikka erishdi (851 & ndash842 Miloddan avvalgi qarang. II Shohlar 3). Keyingi paytlarda Isroil hech qachon Meshni Iordan vodiysigacha kengaytirgan Mo'abni bo'ysundira olmadi. Ammo Yahudo shohlari IX asrda Yohushafat va Yoram davrida Edomning katta qismini boshqarishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi, yana VIII asrda Amaziyo va Uzziyo davrida.

VIII asr bilan Miloddan avvalgi, Transjordanning turar -joy maydoni yana qisqarishni boshladi, bu jarayon ellinistik davrgacha davom etdi. Ossuriya shohi Tiglat-Pileser III 732 yilda Isroil aholisining bir qismini Giladdan deportatsiya qildi. Miloddan avvalgi Ammonliklar mustaqilliklarini saqlab qolishdi va Edomliklar Axaz davrida Yahudiy hukmronligini tashlab ketishdi (743 va ndash727) Miloddan avvalgi). Quddus qulashi va aholisi Navuxadnazar tomonidan 586 yilda deportatsiya qilinganidan keyin Miloddan avvalgi, Edomitlar Yahudiyaning janubiga ko'chib o'tdilar va ularning o'rnini asta -sekin qishloq xo'jaligi, arxitektura va san'at sohasidagi ulkan yutuqlari bilan mashhur bo'lgan xalq Nabatiyaliklar egallab olishdi. Ularning shohligi Transjordaniya, Falastin va Suriya qismlaridan tashkil topgan va Petra ularning poytaxti bo'lgan (IV asr) Miloddan avvalgi). Fors davrida Ammonni *Tobiadlar yahudiy oilasi boshqargan, ularning ildizi Giladda Isroil monarxiyasi davridan boshlangan.

Ellinistik davrda Transjordaniya arab istilosigacha davom etadigan yangi farovonlik davri boshlandi. Ptolemeylar yoki Salavkiylar shimoliy qismida bir qancha shaharlarga asos solishdi: shimolda Gadara va Abila, undan keyin Pella va Gerasa. Rab-Ammon Filadelfiya shahriga aylandi va Filadelfiya va Iordaniya (Pereya) o'rtasida yahudiylar yashaydigan hududni boshqargan Tobiadlar hududidan ajralib chiqdi.

Transjordan 218 yilda Ptolemeydan Salavkiylar hukmronligiga vaqtincha o'tdi Miloddan avvalgi va doimiy ravishda 198 yilda Miloddan avvalgi Xasmonean kengayishi davomida Transjordanning katta maydonlarini Jonatan (Perey), Jon Gyrcanus (Madaba va Xeshbon) va Aleksandr Yannay (Moabdan Zeredgacha, Gerasa, Pella va Gadara) bosib olishdi. 63 yilda Miloddan avvalgi, Pompey yunon shaharlari avtonomiyasini tiklab, yahudiylarga faqat Pereyani qoldirdi. Rim hukmronligi ostida yunon elementini mustahkamlash uchun u Filadelfiyani o'z ichiga olgan Dekapolis ligasini tuzdi.

Bir vaqtlar Hirod Gadarani boshqargan, u vafotidan keyin Suriyaga qaytarilgan. Birinchi yahudiy urushida Perey rimliklar tomonidan bosib olingan (68 Milodiy), lekin uning yahudiy aholisi qoldi. 97 yilda Pella yaqinidagi Belt al-Rash shahrida Kapitoliy shaharchasi tashkil etilgan. 106 yilda Trajan Nabatean qirolligini Madaba, Esbus (Xeshbon), Areopolis (Rabbath-Moab), Charachmoba va Petra shaharlarini qo'shib oldi, ular Filadelfiya va Gerasa qo'shilgan Arabistonning yangi provinsiyasi tarkibiga kirdi. Bu shaharlar ikkinchi asrda gullab -yashnagan Milodiy Antoninlar ostida, Elatdan (Aila) Bostraga Transjordaniya bo'ylab o'tadigan yangi asfaltlangan yo'l (Via Nova) tufayli.

Xristianlik 70 -yilda Quddus jamoasi Pellaga ko'chib o'tishi bilan Transjordanda o'z o'rnini topdi Milodiy Vizantiya davrida janubiy Transjordaniya Palaestinaga qo'shildi IIIqolganlari Arabistonga. Barcha yirik shaharlarda cherkovlar va monastirlar qurilgan va episkoplar cherkov kengashlarida qatnashgan.

Vizantiya hukmronligining so'nggi asrlarida bu erdagi arablarning ta'siri aniqlandi. Arablar va Vizantiya o'rtasidagi birinchi jang 629 yilda, Muhammad payg'ambar hayotligida, Transjordanda (Mu rsquota shahrida, Qoraqor yaqinida) bo'lib o'tdi. Arablarning yakuniy istilosi bir necha bosqichda amalga oshirildi: 630 yilda Transjordaniya janubi, 634 yilda Seir va Mo'ab tog'lari, 635 yilda viloyatning qolgan qismi qo'lga olindi. tashkil etilgan.

Dastlabki arab davrida, Jerashgacha bo'lgan hudud Jund al-Urdun markaziy Transjordaniya, shu jumladan, Amman, Jund Filasin va shimoliy qismi Jund Dimashq (Damashq) bilan bog'liq edi. Arablar hukmronligi ostida Transjordanning shimoliy qismi, shimoliy Falastin bilan birgalikda Jund al-Urdun deb nomlangan ma'muriy birlikni tashkil etdi, poytaxti Tiberiya edi. Markaziy va janubiy Transjordaniya, unga teng qismlari Iordan daryosining g'arbida, Ramlehdan boshqariladigan Jund Filastinga aylandi. Arab davri salib yurishlaridan keyin (13-19 -asrlar) ko'p asrlar davomida namoyon bo'ladigan aholi sonining yangi pasayishining boshlanishini ko'rsatdi.

Salib yurishlari davrida Ijodiy vodiysi, Ajlinning bir qismi, Qorak va Shavbak tog'lari Qizil dengizgacha Terre D 'Outre Jourdain nomi bilan tanilgan knyazlikka birlashtirildi. Salibchilar va ayniqsa Monreal (Shawbak) qal'asi hukmdorlari ziyoratchilarni Makka va hatto muqaddas shaharlarga boradigan yo'l bilan tahdid qilar ekan, Saladin Tszin jangidan oldin salibchilar qal'alariga hujum qilib, ularni kamaytirdi.

Mamluklar hukmronligi davrida Transjordaniya Mamlakat Dimashq (tumanlar) o'rtasida bo'lindi.aYmolʿAjlūn va al-Balqā ʾ) va Mamlakat al-Karak, jumladan, Maan, Shawbak, Zughar (Zoar) va Qorak. Baybars davrida uni Ayyubiylar sulolasining oxirgi avlodi boshqargan.

Usmonli davrida Transjordan aholisi eng past darajaga yetdi va Transjordanning katta qismi badaviylarga qoldi, garchi sultonlar g'arbiy hududlarda ma'muriy boshqaruvni saqlab qolishgan. Viloyatning katta qismi uning tarkibiga kirgan viloyat Damashq, Xavron Sanjaklariga (Jabbokka), Nablus Sancaklariga, ba'zida Balqos va al-Qorak Sanjaklariga bo'lingan. Janubiy qismlar, Ma & rsquoan va Aqaba, uning bir qismi edi viloyat Hijozdan. Biroq, Usmonli hukmronligi ko'pincha nominal edi. Transjordaniya Suriya va Falastinning hovlisi deb hisoblanar edi va Usmonlilarga faqat har yili haj safariga borar edi, chunki Damashqdan kelgan asosiy Haj karvoni Madinaga boradigan yo'ldan o'tishi kerak edi. Faqat 19-asrning ikkinchi yarmida, Misrning qisqa muddatli bosib olishidan so'ng (1831 va ndash40) va islohotlar davrida (Tanzimat), Abdulhamid II davrida, ko'chirish boshlandi. Usmonlilar Transjordan ustidan to'g'ridan -to'g'ri hukmronlik qilishdi. Sanjakning poytaxti Karak, bu shahardagi yirik shahar edi va uning gubernatori yurisdiktsiyasi Transjordaniyaning ko'p qismini qamrab olgan. Rossiya bosib olgan Kavkazdan kelgan cherkes qochqinlari Usmonlilar tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlangach (1861 va ndash64, keyinroq 1877 va ndash78 yillardagi turk-rus urushidan keyin) Falastin va Transjordanga hijrat qilishlari bilan mahalliy aholi ko'paygan. Ikkinchisida ular Ammon, Zarqa va Jarash va uning atrofida joylashdilar.

19 -asr, shuningdek, Evropaning Transjordanga bo'lgan qiziqishining kuchayishiga guvoh bo'ldi, asosan arxeologik va tarixiy sabablarga ko'ra va 1812 yilda Burxardt Petrani, 1806 yilda esa Zetzen Jarashni kashf etdi. 19 -asrning ikkinchi yarmida, Falastinni tadqiq qilish jamg'armasi, shuningdek, Transjordaniyadagi xristian cherkovlari va missiyalarining qiziqishi, shu jumladan, Mesha stelasi va Madaba mozaik xaritasini kashf etdi. 1900 va ndash08 yilda Usmoniylar Damashqdan Madinaga Hijoziy temir yo'lini qurdilar. 1200 km masofaning uchdan bir qismi. chiziq Transjordandan o'tib, uni Damashq va Istanbul ma'muriy markazlariga yaqinlashtirdi, shu bilan birga Qorakda bir necha qo'zg'olonlarni qo'zg'atdi.

1914 yildan keyingi zamonaviy davr uchun Iordaniyani ham ko'ring.

BIBLOGRAFIYA:

G. Shumaxer, Iordaniya bo'ylab (1886) idem, Ostjordanland xaritasi (1908) A. Musil, Arabistoni Petraea (1907) R.E. Bruennau va A. Domashevskiy, Provinsiya Arabistoni, 3 jild. (1904 va ndash09) C. Sternagel, Der Adschlun (1927) X. Rhotert, Transjordaniya (1938) N. Glyuk, Iordaniyaning narigi tomoni (1940), Sharqiy Falastindagi tadqiqotlar, 4 jild. (1934 va ndash51) A. Konikoff, Transjordaniya (1946) L. Xarding, Iordaniya antik davrlari (1959). QO'ShING. BIBLOGRAFIYA: N. Lyuis, Suriya va Iordaniyadagi ko'chmanchilar va ko'chmanchilar (1987) R.S. AbuJaber, Iordaniya ustidan kashshoflar: Transjordaniyadagi chegara qarorgohi 1850 & ndash 1914 (1989) E. Rogan, Kech Usmonli imperiyasidagi davlat chegaralari: Transjordan 1850 & ndash 1921 (1999).

[Maykl Avi-Yona / Jozef Nevo (2-nashr)]

Manba: Judaica ensiklopediyasi. & nusxa ko'chirish 2008 Geyl guruhi. Barcha huquqlar himoyalangan.


Iroq va Transjordaniya xoshimiy podshohlari begona hisoblanganmi? - Tarix

227. Deptda podshoh Abdulloh bilan gaplashishda hech qanday aniq izoh yo'q (Embtel 241 8 iyun 8), lekin siz umumiy manfaatlar uchun arab hamkorligining rivojlanishiga umumiy qiziqishimizni ta'kidlashni va Yaqin Sharqda hech qanday barqarorlik susaymasligiga umid bildirishni taklif qilasiz. mumkin bo'lgan muvaffaqiyatsizliklar tufayli arab davlatlari o'rtasida o'zaro ishonchni munosib darajada saqlab qolish va rivojlantirish. Buyuk Suriyaning qo'zg'olonining arab dunyosiga davom etayotganidan xavotirimizni norasmiy ravishda bildirishingiz mumkin.

Yaqinda Iroq-Trans Iordaniya, Turkiya-Iroq va Turkiya-Transjordaniya bitimlarining yo'nalishi va maqsadi bizni qiziqtiradi va tashvishga soladi. Agar shartnomalar haqiqatan ham yuqori siyosatni aks ettirsa, Buyuk Britaniyaning roziligi yoki tashabbusi bilan ikkita Hashimit hukmdori tomonidan boshlangan Arab Ligasidan voz kechsa, biz o'z siyosatimizni yo'naltirish bo'yicha to'liq bilimga ega bo'lishimiz kerak. Agar siz Abdullaning tashrifi va Senat tomonidan tasdiqlangan Turkiya-Iroq shartnomasini ushbu harakatlarning asl sabablarini aniqlash uchun Abdulla, Nuri 2 va boshqalar bilan suhbatlarda ishlatsangiz, ayniqsa foydali bo'ladi. 3


Yaqin Sharqda G'arbning bir asrlik aralashuvi: fon

O'tgan hafta Davlat kotibi Mayk Pompeo Misrga tashrif buyurdi va Qohiradagi Amerika universitetida ma'ruza qildi. Davlat kotibi Pompeo Prezident Obamaning 2009 yilda Qohirada prezident bo'lganidan keyin aytgan "Yangi boshlanish" nomli mashhur nutqiga ishora qilib, mintaqadagi tashqi siyosatini tanqid qildi. U Obamani Amerikaning mintaqadagi ishtirokidan chekinishida aybladi va shunday dedi: "Amerika Yaqin Sharqda yaxshi kuch. Davr. [...] Amerika orqaga chekinganda, tartibsizlik yuzaga keladi. Do'stlarimizni e'tiborsiz qoldirsak, g'azab paydo bo'ladi. Biz dushmanlar bilan hamkorlik qilsak, ular oldinga siljiydilar. "

Nutqdan ikkita savol tug'iladi: G'arbning ishtiroki Yaqin Sharqda yaxshimi? G'arbning mintaqaga aralashuvi G'arb davlatlari manfaatlariga xizmat qiladimi? Yaqin Sharqda Evropa va AQShning borligi haqida qisqacha ma'lumot shuni ko'rsatadiki, G'arb davlatlari ko'pchilik ularning ishtiroki haqida qanday fikrda yoki his -tuyg'ularga e'tibor bermasdan, mintaqadagi elita bilan ishlagan. Ommabop his -tuyg'ularni e'tiborsiz qoldirgan bu munosabatlar katta qarama -qarshiliklarga olib keldi. Natijada G'arb davlatlari orqaga chekinishdi va uzoq muddatda qonuniyligini yo'qotdilar.

Yaqin Sharqdagi Evropaning mavjudligi, Usmonli imperiyasi parchalanib ketganidan so'ng, o'z cho'qqisiga chiqdi, bu Yaqin Sharqning Osiyo erlarini Britaniya va Frantsiya qo'liga berdi. Birinchi jahon urushi boshlanishi bilan Shimoliy Afrikaning ko'p qismi allaqachon Evropa nazorati ostida edi. Urush paytida Britaniya Makka hoshimiy amiri va Muhammad payg'ambar avlodlaridan bo'lgan Sharif Husaynga Usmonli imperiyasiga qarshi isyon ko'targan taqdirda arab erlarining qiroli bo'lishga va'da berdi. Shu bilan birga, Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiya urushdan keyingi davrda Yaqin Sharqdagi ta'sir doiralarini aniqlaydigan maxfiy bitim-Sykes-Piko shartnomasini imzoladilar. Britaniya urush paytida sionistik harakatga Falastindagi yahudiy vatanini va'da qildi. Husayn Usmonli imperiyasiga qarshi isyon ko'targan, ammo uning Suriya, Falastin, Iroq va Hijozda arablar podshosi bo'lish orzusi hech qachon amalga oshmagan.

Urushdan keyin Frantsiya Livan va Suriyada mandat rejimlarini o'rnatdi, Britaniya Iroq, Transjordaniya va Falastin mandatlarini o'z nazoratiga oldi. Frantsiya Livan va Suriyani kichikroq davlatlarga ajratdi va o'z vakillari orqali hukmronlik qildi. Britaniya Sharif Husaynning ikki o'g'lini Iroq va Transjordanda shoh qilib tayinladi. Husaynning o'zi Hijoz podshohiga aylandi, lekin Britaniyaga nisbatan noroziligi oshgani uchun Britaniya rahbarlari saudiyaliklar 1924 yilda Hijoz viloyatiga bostirib kirganlarida ham rozi bo'lishdi. . Britaniya Falastinning mandatini taniqli yahudiy guruhlari va falastinlik oilalar bilan munosabatlar orqali boshqargan.

Birinchi jahon urushidan keyin Evropa kuchlari Yaqin Sharqni o'z nazoratiga olgan bo'lsada, ularning ta'siri vaqt o'tishi bilan yo'q bo'lib ketdi va Yaqin Sharqdagi mustamlakachilik tajribasi majburiyatga aylandi. Evropaliklarning taniqli mahalliy elita bilan tuzgan bitimlari Suriya, Iroq va Misr kabi joylarda g'arbga qarshi va xalqchil millatchilik harakatlarini qo'zg'atdi. G'arbning, xususan, AQShning Isroilga deyarli so'zsiz yordami G'arbga qarshi mafkuralar va guruhlar a'zolarini yollash uchun qulay vositaga aylandi. AQShning Eronga og'ir aralashuvi mintaqada g'arbga qarshi kurashning eng kuchli manbalaridan birini yaratdi.

Suriyada frantsuz mandati Ikkinchi jahon urushi oxirigacha davom etdi. 1946 yildan 1970 yilgacha frantsuz mustamlakachiligining merosi Suriya siyosatiga soya solgan. Suriya frantsuz mandati boshqaruvining ma'muriy bo'linishi tufayli paydo bo'lgan bir nechta raqobatbardosh guruhlarning jang maydoniga aylandi. Natijada, Suriyada tez -tez harbiy to'ntarishlar bilan uzoq vaqt beqarorlik yuz berdi. Guruh manfaatlari va tafovutlarni chetga surib, barcha kurashayotgan partiyalarni birlashtirgan narsa bu - Evropaning aralashuviga reaktsiya sifatida paydo bo'lgan arab millatchiligining populistik versiyasiga murojaat qilish edi. Hofiz Asad 1970 yilda uyushtirgan oxirgi harbiy to'ntarish 2011 yilgacha nisbatan barqarorlikka olib keldi va minglab odamlarning o'limiga va repressiv politsiya holatiga olib keldi. 2000 yilda otasi vafotidan keyin hokimiyatga kelgan Hofiz Asad va uning o'g'li Bashar Asad Suriyadagi hukmronliklarining ko'p qismida G'arbga qarshi siyosat bilan ittifoqdosh edilar.


WI: barcha xoshimiylar shohligi omon qoladimi?

Bundan tashqari, Baas rejimining 2 rejimi qanday bo'lishini hisobga olsak, bir nechta xoshimiylar bundan yaxshiroq ish qilmasligi mumkin.

Imperator Konstantin

Xo'sh, birinchi navbatda bu "xoshimiy", to'g'rimi?

Bundan tashqari, Baas rejimining 2 rejimi qanday bo'lishini hisobga olsak, bir nechta xoshimiylar bundan yaxshiroq ish qilmasligi mumkin.

Imperator Konstantin

Klandango

Pol V Maknut

Anderman

Napoleonrules

Men Iroq-Eron urushi boshlanishining yagona sababi Husayn ekaniga chin dildan shubha qilaman. Chegaraviy bahslar, neft zaxiralari va diniy tafovutlar (shialar va sunniylar), madaniy va tiliy tafovutlar hali ham mavjud bo'lib qoladi va deyarli barchasi urushga qo'shiladi. Inqilob ko'proq G'arbning ta'siri va unga qarshi reaktsiya bilan bog'liq edi.

Biz, shuningdek, Iordaniya - bu Hoshimiylar podshohligi ekanligini unutayotganga o'xshaymiz (uni ingliz tiliga qanday qilib transliteratsiya qilsangiz ham, bu muhim emas!) Biz 1900 -yillarning boshlarida Ikkinchi jahon urushi bilan bog'liq monarxlar (ko'rish va "urush" qachon tugashiga qaramay) amakivachchalarim va men o'tiraman & quot) urushlarni yo'q qilmaydi va to'xtatmaydi. Hijaz podshohini ko'rishingiz mumkin edi, agar u Saudlar oilasini mag'lub qilsa, oxir -oqibat boshqa taxtlarda amakivachchalarning yordami bilan xalifa unvonini olishga harakat qiling, chunki Xojimiy Xijoz shohlari Muhammadning avlodidan.

Cregan

Menimcha, biz xonadagi Isroil filiga e'tibor bermayapmiz.

Arab-Isroil mojarosi Suriya, Iroq, Iordaniya va Arabistondagi hashimiy monarxlar bilan qanday kechadi?

Isfendil

Blackfox5

Iroqdagi omon qolgan Hoshimiy monarxiyasi, shuningdek, Iroq Bag'dod paktidan hech qachon chiqmasligini bildiradi. Iroq Iordaniya kabi konservativ monarxiya bo'lib qolmoqda va nisbatan g'arbparast. Eron ham pakt a'zosi bo'lgani uchun Eron va Iroq ittifoqdosh.

Agar Xedjaz qirolligi ham bo'lsa, ko'p narsa o'zgaradi. Sizda vahhobiylar muqaddas shaharlar uchun mas'ul emas (garchi ular hali ham Arabiston sharqidagi neftga boy hududlarni nazorat qilishsa). Ular, ehtimol, Iordaniya va Iroqning xoshimiylar siyosatiga amal qilishlari mumkin (balki Bag'dod paktiga qo'shilishlari ham mumkin).

Agar ular hokimiyatda qolsalar (bu qiyin, lekin imkonsiz emas - bizda Iordaniya bor, chunki u Iroqni OTL muvaffaqiyatsiz bajarayotgani misolida). Mintaqa g'arbga ko'proq moyil. Biroq, kommunistlar, baaschilar va nosirlarni ushlab turish qiyin bo'ladi. Ko'p narsa Iroqda nima sodir bo'lishiga va agar u g'arbparast diktaturaga o'tib ketsa yoki parlament boshqaruvining qandaydir shakli saqlanib qolsa.

1958 yilda Iordaniya va Iroq qisqacha arab federatsiyasini tuzdilar, ular ikki Hoshimiy monarxiyasini birlashtirdilar. Bu Nosir davrida Birlashgan Arab Respublikasiga javob sifatida qilingan. Arab Federatsiyasi har bir mamlakatning tashqi siyosati va mudofaasini birlashtirdi, lekin boshqa mahalliy dasturlarning katta qismini milliy yurisdiktsiya ostiga qo'ydi. U 1958 yildagi Iroq to'ntarishidan omon qolmadi va shuning uchun atigi yarim yil davom etdi. ITTL, agar monarxiya omon qolsa, Arab Federatsiyasi davom etadi. It also likely includes the Kingdom of the Hedjaz.

It would be very interesting to see how/if the Arab Federation survives. With Baghdad, it controls one of the more important Arab capitals. It will also have guardianship of the holy cities. Iraqi oil also potentially offers some benefits for Jordan and Hedjaz, although Iraq will need to be careful not to alienate domestic opinion. Since the rulers of the three kingdoms share blood ties, it conceivably has a better chance of survival than the UAR.

In such a scenario, I think this puts a lot of constraint on Israel. It possibly puts Jordan into a more anti-Israeli position. It also makes Israel much less likely to antagonize Jordan which is part of the larger Arab Federation. The West Bank (and even East Jerusalem) might very well never belong to Israel. And even if there is a war scenario and Israel occupies it, the chances of a Hashemite-Israeli peace deal is much greater. The Palestinians will never have a chance for a state of their own, and they'll have to tolerate being part of a greater Hashemite kingdom. The PLO likely never achieves the status it does IOTL which also means their terrorist attacks never occur. I don't see anything like the murder at the Munich Olympics ever happening. And if the PLO never goes to Lebanon, then that has lots of potentially beneficial butterflies for Lebanon.

Deleted member 94680

I may be mis-remembering, but didn't the Hashemites get the throne of Iraq after they lost the throne of Syria? Didn't the British throne them a bone after the French kicked them out of their Mandates?

Didn't all of this come about after they lost Hejaz anyway? If they kept that, wouldn't they have no reason to be in power in Syria and Iraq?

Some Bloke

Dathi THorfinnsson

Simon

Emperor Constantine

I sincerely doubt that Hussein is the only reason the Iraq-Iran War began. boundary disputes and oil reserves and religious differences (Shi'ite and Sunni) and cultural and linguistic differences will still exist and will almost certainly all add up to war. The Revolution had more to do with Western influences and the backlash against it.

We also seem to be forgetting that Jordan is a Hashemite kingdom (no matter how you transliterate it in English, it doesn't really matter!) We saw in the early 1900s with WWI that related monarchs (despite the view "the war will end when my cousins and I sit down") does not eliminate or discourage wars. You could see a King of Hejaz, if he defeats the Saud family, eventually try to take the Caliph title with the support of cousins on many of the other thrones, as the Hashemite Hejaz kings are descended from Mohammad himself.

For Iran/Iraq, hard to say. The underlining tensions already existed true, but there's a difference between tension and out and out war. After all both were technically allied by the Baghdad pact. It also depends on Iran. With a POD in 1920 there's no guarantee that an Iranian revolution would occur, nor that it would result in an aggressive Theocratic state. Hell the POD was before the Pahlavis even came to power, so we could end up seeing a Qajar Iran (near ASB I know but within the realm of possibility).

To Jordan and WWI, there's a difference between cousins and brothers going to war with each other. Not to mention they were all of the same family line. We never saw real tension between Jordan and Iraq during the latter's time as a Kingdom, so no reason to think that the same stable situation wouldn't exist TTL. As to the Caliphate, hard to say. OTL King Huessin's proclamation of his Caliphate met mixed reception and didn't stop his Kingdom's destruction by the Saudis. However, if the core middle east is entirely ruled de-jure by his sons, then such a proclamation could very much end differently. Of course its hard to guess how long the Hejaz would last if the Sultanate of Najd remains under the Saudis. I can't see the British backing a Hashemite campaign to drive the Saudis out as it would give to much power to one family without a counterbalance.

I think we're ignoring the Israeli elephant in the room.

How does the Arab-Israeli conflict go with Hashemite monarchs in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Arabia?

Really hard to say. Again with a POD in 1920 we might not even see a State of Israel be created in the first place or it could be quite different than OTL. However, from what I remember the Jordanians were the most moderate towards the Israeli state, so that could be repeated among the other Hashemite Monarchies. Or a more unified Arab League could see a quite different end to the 1948 war. But I don't know much about Israel-Arab relations during that era so someone more knowledgeable than I can probably speculate better.

A surviving Hashemite monarchy in Iraq also means that Iraq probably never leaves the Baghdad Pact. Iraq remains a conservative monarchy like Jordan and is relatively pro-Western. Since Iran is also a member of the Pact, Iran and Iraq are allies.

If there is also a Hashemite Kingdom of the Hedjaz, then lots of things change. You don't have the Wahhabists in charge of the holy cities (although likely they will still be in control of the oil rich regions in the east of Arabia). They would likely follow Hashemite policy of Jordan and Iraq (maybe even also joining the Baghdad Pact).

Assuming they stay in power (which is difficult, but not impossible - we have Jordan as a country which successfully thread the needle even as OTL Iraq is an example of failure to do so), this drastically alters the Middle East. The region is more pro-Western. However, it will have difficulty holding off the Communists, Ba'athists, and Nasserites. Much depends on what happens in Iraq, and if it devolves into a pro-Western dictatorship, or if some form of parliamentary rule survives.

In 1958, Jordan and Iraq formed a brief Arab Federation which joined the two Hashemite monarchies together. It was done as a response to the United Arab Republic under Nasser. The Arab Federation united foreign policy and defense of each country but left the vast majority of other domestic programs under national jurisdiction. It didn't survive the 1958 coup in Iraq and therefore only lasted half a year. ITTL if the monarchy survives, then the Arab Federation continues. It also likely includes the Kingdom of the Hedjaz.

It would be very interesting to see how/if the Arab Federation survives. With Baghdad, it controls one of the more important Arab capitals. It will also have guardianship of the holy cities. Iraqi oil also potentially offers some benefits for Jordan and Hedjaz, although Iraq will need to be careful not to alienate domestic opinion. Since the rulers of the three kingdoms share blood ties, it conceivably has a better chance of survival than the UAR.

In such a scenario, I think this puts a lot of constraint on Israel. It possibly puts Jordan into a more anti-Israeli position. It also makes Israel much less likely to antagonize Jordan which is part of the larger Arab Federation. The West Bank (and even East Jerusalem) might very well never belong to Israel. And even if there is a war scenario and Israel occupies it, the chances of a Hashemite-Israeli peace deal is much greater. The Palestinians will never have a chance for a state of their own, and they'll have to tolerate being part of a greater Hashemite kingdom. The PLO likely never achieves the status it does IOTL which also means their terrorist attacks never occur. I don't see anything like the murder at the Munich Olympics ever happening. And if the PLO never goes to Lebanon, then that has lots of potentially beneficial butterflies for Lebanon.

Thanks for the detailed response. First off, not to sure about the Saudis. From what I've read about Ibn Saud he seems like an all or nothing type of guy. Would it be possible for the Hejaz to crush the Saudi state and form their own version of Saudi Arabia? If not then I think we'd see multiple wars between the peninsula's two native powers.

To what Iraq would look like, hard to say. I'd guess it would depend on how long Nur al-Said remains in power. Under his premiership the Parliament was a rubber stamp assembly, so once he's out the Iraqi government could begin to transition into a more democratic or at least parliamentary state. Although either way the Monarchy would retain a large amount of power, though how its used would depend on Faisal II (we don't know much about him).

Second, considering the ambitions of Hussein ibn Ali which seemed to be shared by his sons, I could see a TTL version of the Arab Federation form earlier, like say the forties. Maybe in place of the Arab League. So assuming the Hashemites form an Arabian Kingdom, we'd have all the territory between Egypt and Iran under a single polity. Considering the oil wealth of these states OTL it would potentially form a middle power, rivaling the West and the East.

Third, at this point would Israel even be in the cards? I mean if the Arab League/Federation is more unified we could see the TTL 1948 war end the Jewish state before it properly begins. Although, at the very least Israel would remain in its UN borders while the rest of Palestine goes to either Jordan (if it exists here) or to Syria. Would Lebanon still end up as an independent nation here or would it be a state/province of Syria?

I may be mis-remembering, but didn't the Hashemites get the throne of Iraq after they lost the throne of Syria? Didn't the British throne them a bone after the French kicked them out of their Mandates?

Didn't all of this come about after they lost Hejaz anyway? If they kept that, wouldn't they have no reason to be in power in Syria and Iraq?

Ha va yo'q. The initially Iraq was to Faisal's brother Abdullah in March 1920 but he declined (not sure why). Later after Faisal was deposed he was suggested as a candidate for the Iraqi throne and accepted.

As to why, Hejaz had the holy cities but not much else. Iraq and Syria were two of the wealthiest countries in the Middle east and sat on strategic territories. Why limit your family to one throne when it can have three or even four?

OTL there was a lot of musical thrones in 1920-1921. Originally Faisal was to be King of Greater Syria, which was modern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. Abdullah was designated as King of Iraq at the 1920 Cairo conference but never formally ascended the throne. After the Syrian Kingdom was dissolved by the French Faisal went into exile in London and was later made King of Iraq in 1921 because of his apparent conciliatory attitude towards the Great Powers and based on advice from T. E. Lawrence, more commonly known as Lawrence of Arabia. In turn Abdullah was made the Emir of Transjordan, another of Britain's Mandate territories, later becoming today's Jordan.

So if Faisal keeps Syria then Abdullah becomes King of Iraq (the offer preceding the fall of Arab Syria). Then the only Hashemite Prince lacking a throne is Prince Zeid, OTL's later Pretender of Iraq. And even then he could end up as King of Palestine, at least potentially.


“The Human Being Is Our Most Precious Asset”

On 2 May 1953, His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal received constitutional powers amidst a delicate phase in Arab and international history. His Majesty was able to achieve the highest levels of civil and political development, becoming the builder of a moderate Jordan and securing a decent life for his people, in terms of advancement in the fields of public services, education and science. Jordan also continued to play its Arab and regional role ably and effectively

Throughout 47 years of His Majesty’s leadership, Jordan achieved tangible progress in all fields, especially economically, socially and politically. His Majesty coined the saying “The human being is our most precious asset,” as the cornerstone of development plans, with a focus on ensuring that their gains benefit all regions and all segments of society.

In continuation of a never-ending Hashemite journey of giving, King Hussein’s son, His Majesty King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, took on the mantle by assuming constitutional powers on 7 February 1999.


1921-1933 - British Mandate

At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British set the parameters for Iraqi political life that were to continue until the 1958 revolution they chose Faisal as Iraq's first King they established an indigenous Iraqi army and they proposed a new treaty. To confirm Faisal as Iraq's first monarch, a one-question plebiscite was carefully arranged that had a return of 96 percent in his favor. The British saw in Faisal a leader who possessed sufficient nationalist and Islamic credentials to have broad appeal, but who also was vulnerable enough to remain dependent on their support. Faisal traced his descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad, and his ancestors had held political authority in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the tenth century. The British believed that these credentials would satisfy traditional Arab standards of political legitimacy moreover, the British thought that Faisal would be accepted by the growing Iraqi nationalist movement because of his role in the 1916 revolt against the Turks, his achievements as a leader of the Arab emancipation movement, and his general leadership qualities.

As a counterforce to the nationalistic inclinations of the monarchy and as a means of insuring the king's dependence, the British cultivated the tribal shaykhs, whose power had been waning since the end of the nineteenth century. While the new king sought to create a national consciousness, to strengthen the institutions of the emerging state, and especially to create a national military, the tribal shaykhs supported a fragmented community and sought to weaken the coercive power of the state. A major goal of the British policy was to keep the monarchy stronger than any one tribe but weaker than a coalition of tribes so that British power would ultimately be decisive in arbitrating disputes between the two.

Ultimately, the British-created monarchy suffered from a chronic legitimacy crisis: the concept of a monarchy was alien to Iraq. Despite his Islamic and pan-Arab credentials, Faisal was not an Iraqi, and, no matter how effectively he ruled, Iraqis saw the monarchy as a British creation. The continuing inability of the government to gain the confidence of the people fueled political instability well into the 1970s.

The British decision at the Cairo Conference to establish an indigenous Iraqi army was significant. In Iraq, as in most of the developing world, the military establishment has been the best organized institution in an otherwise weak political system. Thus, while Iraq's body politic crumbled under immense political and economic pressure throughout the monarchic period, the military gained increasing power and influence moreover, because the officers in the new army were by necessity Sunnis who had served under the Ottomans, while the lower ranks were predominantly filled by Shia tribal elements, Sunni dominance in the military was preserved.

The final major decision taken at the Cairo Conference related to the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Faisal was under pressure from the nationalists and the anti-British mujtahids of An Najaf and Karbala to limit both British influence in Iraq and the duration of the treaty. Recognizing that the monarchy depended on British support--and wishing to avoid a repetition of his experience in Syria--Faisal maintained a moderate approach in dealing with Britain. The twenty-year treaty, which was ratified in October 1922, stated that the king would heed British advice on all matters affecting British interests and on fiscal policy as long as Iraq was in debt to Britain, and that British officials would be appointed to specified posts in eighteen departments to act as advisers and inspectors. A subsequent financial agreement, which significantly increased the financial burden on Iraq, required Iraq to pay half the cost of supporting British resident officials, among other expenses. British obligations under the new treaty included providing various kinds of aid, notably military assistance, and proposing Iraq for membership in the League of Nations at the earliest moment. In effect, the treaty ensured that Iraq would remain politically and economically dependent on Britain. While unable to prevent the treaty, Faisal clearly felt that the British had gone back on their promises to him.

After the treaty had been signed, Iraq readied itself for the country-wide elections that had been provided for in the May 1922 Electoral Law. There were important changes in the government at this time. Cox resigned his position as high commissioner and was replaced by Sir Henry Dobbs Iraq's aging prime minister, Abd ar Rahman al Gailani, stepped down and was replaced by Abd al Muhsin as Saadun. In April 1923, Saadun signed a protocol that shortened the treaty period to four years. As a result of the elections, however, Saadun was replaced by Jafar al Askari, a veteran of the Arab Revolt and an early supporter of Faisal.

The elected Constituent Assembly met for the first time in March 1924, and it formally ratified the treaty despite strong (and sometimes physical) opposition on the part of many in the assembly. The assembly also accepted the Organic Law that declared Iraq to be a sovereign state with a representative system of government and a hereditary constitutional monarchy. The newly ratified constitution-- which, along with the treaty, had been hotly debated--legislated an important British role in Iraqi affairs. The major issue at stake in the constitutional debate revolved around the powers of the monarchy. In the final draft, British interests prevailed, and the monarchy was granted wide-ranging powers that included the right to confirm all laws, to call for a general election, to prorogue parliament, and to issue ordinances for the fulfillment of treaty obligations without parliamentary sanctions. Like the treaty, the constitution provided the British with a means of indirect control in Iraq.

After the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was ratified, the most pressing issue confronting the newly established constitutional monarchy was the question of boundaries, especially in the former Ottoman wilayah of Mosul, now known as Mosul Province. The status of Mosul Province was complicated by two factors, the British desire to gain oil concessions and the existence of a majority Kurdish population that was seeking independence apart from either Iraq or Turkey. According to the Treaty of Sevres, concluded in 1920 with the Ottoman Sultan, Mosul was to be part of an autonomous Kurdish state. The treaty was scrapped, however, when nationalist leader Mustafa Kamal (1881-1938--also known as Atat rk) came to power in Turkey and established control over the Kurdish areas in eastern Turkey. In 1923, after two failed British attempts to establish an autonomous Kurdish province, London decided to include the Kurds in the new Iraqi state with the proviso that Kurds would hold government positions in Kurdish areas and that the Kurdish language would be preserved. The British decision to include Mosul in Iraq was based largely on their belief that the area contained large oil deposits.

Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British- controlled Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) had held concessionary rights to the Mosul wilayah. Under the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement--an agreement in 1916 between Britain and France that delineated future control of the Middle East--the area would have fallen under French influence. In 1919, however, the French relinquished their claims to Mosul under the terms of the Long- Berenger Agreement. The 1919 agreement granted the French a 25 percent share in the TPC as compensation. Beginning in 1923, British and Iraqi negotiators held acrimonious discussions over the new oil concession. The major obstacle was Iraq's insistence on a 20 percent equity participation in the company this figure had been included in the original TPC concession to the Turks and had been agreed upon at San Remo for the Iraqis. In the end, despite strong nationalist sentiments against the concession agreement, the Iraqi negotiators acquiesced to it. The League of Nations was soon to vote on the disposition of Mosul, and the Iraqis feared that, without British support, Iraq would lose the area to Turkey. In March 1925, an agreement was concluded that contained none of the Iraqi demands. The TPC, now renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), was granted a concession for a period of seventy-five years.

In 1925 the League of Nations decided that Mosul Province would be considered a part of Iraq, but it also suggested that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty be extended from four to twenty-five years as a protection for the Kurdish minority, who intensely distrusted the Iraqi government. The Iraqis also were to give due regard to Kurdish sensibilities in matters of culture and of language. Although reluctant to do so, the Iraqi assembly ratified the treaty in January 1926. Turkey was eventually reconciled to the loss by being promised one-tenth of any oil revenues that might accrue in the area, and a tripartite Anglo-Turco-Iraqi treaty was signed in July 1926. This settlement was to have important repercussions, both positive and negative, for the future of Iraq. Vast oil revenues would accrue from the Mosul Province, but the inclusion of a large number of well-armed and restless Kurds in Iraqi territory would continue to plague Iraqi governments.

With the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the settling of the Mosul question, Iraqi politics took on a new dynamic. The emerging class of Sunni and Shia landowning tribal shaykhs vied for positions of power with wealthy and prestigious urban-based Sunni families and with Ottoman-trained army officers and bureaucrats. Because Iraq's newly established political institutions were the creation of a foreign power, and because the concept of democratic government had no precedent in Iraqi history, the politicians in Baghdad lacked legitimacy and never developed deeply rooted constituencies. Thus, despite a constitution and an elected assembly, Iraqi politics was more a shifting alliance of important personalities and cliques than a democracy in the Western sense. The absence of broadly based political institutions inhibited the early nationalist movement's ability to make deep inroads into Iraq's diverse social structure. Thus, despite the widely felt resentment at Iraq's mandate status, the burgeoning nationalist movement was largely ineffective.

Nonetheless, through the late 1920s, the nationalists persisted in opposing the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and in demanding independence. A treaty more favorable to the Iraqis was presented in December 1927. It remained unratified, however, because of nationalist demands for an unconditional promise of independence. This promise eventually was made by the new high commissioner, Sir Gilbert Clayton, in 1929, but the confusion occasioned by the sudden death of Clayton and by the suicide of Abd al Muhsin as Saadun, the most powerful Iraqi advocate of the treaty, delayed the writing of a new treaty. In June 1929, the nationalists received their first positive response from London when a newly elected Labour Party government announced its intention to support Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932 and to negotiate a new treaty recognizing Iraq's independence.

Faisal's closest adviser (and soon-to-be Iraqi strongman), Nuri as Said, carried out the treaty negotiations. Despite widespread opposition, Nuri as Said was able to force the treaty through parliament. The new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in June 1930. It provided for a "close alliance," for "full and frank consultations between the two countries in all matters of foreign policy," and for mutual assistance in case of war. Iraq granted the British the use of air bases near Basra and at Al Habbaniyah and the right to move troops across the country. The treaty, of twenty-five years' duration, was to come into force upon Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. The terms of the treaty gained Nuri as Said favor in British eyes but discredited him in the eyes of the Iraqi nationalists, who vehemently opposed its lengthy duration and the leasing of air bases. The Kurds and the Assyrians also opposed the treaty because it offered no guarantees for their status in the new country.


Rule Under Saddam

In July 1979, Bakr resigned, and his chosen successor, Saddam Hussein, assumed the offices of both President and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. He was the de facto ruler of Iraq for some years before he formally came to power.

Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), eventually devastating the economy. Iraq declared victory in 1988 but actually achieved a weary return to the status -kvo ante bellum. The war left Iraq with the largest military establishment in the Persian Gulf region but with huge debts and an ongoing rebellion by Kurdish elements in the northern mountains. The government suppressed the rebellion by using weapons on civilian targets, including a mass chemical weapons attack on the city of Halabja that killed several thousand civilians. The Iraqi government continued to be supported by the US, which continued sending arms shipments.

Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction culminated in the '70s with "Osirak", the French built nuclear reactor in Iraq. In 1981, the reactor was destroyed by Israeli Air-Force jets. Saddam reacted by executing Iraqi generals in charge of defense. Israel claimed it acted to protect itself from threat of mass murder, but the action was internationally condemned as aggressive. However, in hind sight, following the Persian Gulf War this action might be viewed a prescient intervention, to prevent Iraq from developing a nuclear military capability - a capability which would have most likely deterred the UN intervention in defence of Kuwait.

Invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf War

A long-standing territorial dispute led to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Iraq accused Kuwait of violating the Iraqi border to secure oil resources, and demanded that its debt repayments should be waived. Direct negotiations began in July 1990, but they soon failed. Saddam Hussein had an emergency meeting with April Glaspie, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, on July 25, 1990, airing his concerns but stating his intention to continue talks. April Glaspie informed Saddam that the United States had no interest in Iraq/Kuwait border disputes.

Arab mediators convinced Iraq and Kuwait to negotiate their differences in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on 1 August 1990, but that session resulted only in charges and counter-charges. A second session was scheduled to take place in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, but Iraq invaded Kuwait the next day. Iraqi troops overran the country shortly after midnight on August 2, 1990. The United Nations Security Council and the Arab League immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion. Four days later, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Iraq that prohibited nearly all trade with Iraq.

Iraq responded to the sanctions by annexing Kuwait as the "19th Province" of Iraq on 8 August, prompting the exiled Sabah family to call for a stronger international response. Over the ensuing months, the United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions condemned the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and implementing total mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq. Other countries subsequently provided support for "Operation Desert Shield". In November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678, permitting member states to use all necessary means, authorising military action against the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait, and demanded a complete withdrawal by January 15 1991.

When Saddam Hussein failed to comply with this demand, the Persian Gulf War (Operation "Desert Storm") ensued on the 17th of January 1991 (3 a.m. Iraq time), with allied troops of 28 countries, led by the US launching an aerial bombardment on Baghdad. The war, which proved disastrous for Iraq, lasted only six weeks, one hundred and forty thousand tons of munitions had showered down on the country, the equivalent of 7 Hiroshima bombs. Probably as many as 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and tens of thousands of civilians were killed.

Allied air raids destroyed roads, bridges, factories, and oil-industry facilities (shutting down the national refining and distribution system) and disrupted electric, telephone, and water service. Conference centres and shopping and residential areas were hit. Hundreds of Iraqis were killed in the attack on the Al-Amiriyah bomb shelter. Diseases spread through contaminated drinking water because water purification and sewage treatment facilities could not operate without electricity.

A cease-fire was announced by the US on 28 February 1991. UN Secretary-General Javier P rez de Cu llar met with Saddam Hussein to discuss the Security Council timetable for the withdraw of troops from Kuwait. Iraq agreed to UN terms for a permanent cease-fire in April 1991, and strict conditions were imposed, demanding the disclosure and destruction of all stockpiles of weapons.

Iraq under UN Sanction

On August 6 1990 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 661 which imposed stringent economic sanctions on Iraq, providing for a full trade embargo, excluding medical supplies, food and other items of humanitarian necessity, these to be determined by the Security Council sanctions committee. After End of war Iraqi sanctions were linked to removal of Weapons of mass destruction by Resolution 687[1] (http://www.mideastweb.org/687.htm) .Iraq was later allowed under the UN Oil-for-Food program (Resolution 986) to export $5.2 billion (USD) of oil every 6 months with which to purchase these items to sustain the civilian population. According to UN estimates, a million children died during trade embargo, due to malnutrition or lack of medical supplies. 30% of the proceeds were redirected to a war reparations account.

The United States, in an attempt to prevent the genocide of the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq and the Kurds to the north, declared "air exclusion zones" north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel. The Clinton administration judged an alleged attempted assassination of former President George H. W. Bush while in Kuwait to be worthy of a military response on 27 June 1993. The Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad was targeted by 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles, launched from US warships in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Three missiles were declared to have missed the target, causing some collateral damage to nearby residential housing and eight civilian deaths.

In May 1995 Saddam sacked his half-brother, Wathban, as Interior Minister and in July demoted his notorious and powerful Defense Minister, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known popularly as "Chemical Ali" because of his role in gassing operations in Kurdistan. These personnel changes were the result of the growth in power of Saddam Hussein's two sons, Uday Hussein and Qusay Hussein, who were given effective vice-presidential authority in May 1995. They were able to remove most of Saddam's loyal followers and it seemed clear that Saddam felt more secure protected by his immediate family members. In August Major General Hussein Kamil Hassan al-Majid, his Minister of Military Industries and a key henchman, defected to Jordan, together with his wife (one of Saddam's daughters) and his brother, Saddam, who was married to another of the president's daughters both called for the overthrow of the Iraqi government. In response, Saddam promised full co-operation with the UN commission disarming Iraq (UNSCOM) in order to pre-empt any revelations that the defector could make.

The weakening of the internal position of the government occurred at a time when the external opposition forces were as weak as ever, too divided among themselves to take any effective action. At the same time, France and Russia pushed for an easing of sanctions. US determination to keep up the pressure on Iraq prevailed however. In any case, the apparent weakening of the government was illusory, not least when the two defectors returned home and were killed, apparently by other clan members, in a warning to other potential defectors. In fact, during 1996, the government's grip on power seemed to have significantly strengthened despite its inability to end the UN sanctions against it.

In December 1998, US President Bill Clinton authorized air strikes on government targets and military facilities. In response, Saddam expelled all UN inspectors and closed off the country. Intermittent air strikes against military facilities and alleged WMD sites continued into 2002.

2003 invasion of Iraq

Following talks with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in September 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush urged the United Nations to encourage Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to comply with UN resolutions or "actions will be unavoidable". Bush said that Saddam has repeatedly violated 16 UN Security Council resolutions, which include a call for Iraq to "disarm its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs". Iraqi officials rejected Bush's assertions (that were based on flawed intelligency reports, as it later emerged), and a team of U.N. inspectors lead by Swedish diplomat Hans Blix was admitted into the country their final report stated that Iraqis capability in producing "weapons of mass destruction" was not significantly different from 1992, when the country dismantled the bulk of their remaining arsenals under terms of the ceasefire agreement with U.N. forces. The United States and the United Kingdom opposed the team's requests for more time to further investigate the matter the U.N. Security Council hence refused to issue a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.

In March 2003 the United States and the United Kingdom, with some aid from other nations, invaded Iraq.


Circassian and Chechen minorities

17 The Circassians are a mosaic of peoples, languages and various socio-political organizations, grouped under the name Adyge, or “men”. In the late nineteenth century, the Russians drove them out of the north-west Caucasus towards the territories of the Ottoman Empire, which allocated land to them ( de Bel Air 2003). The first Circassians and Chechens were accepted by the Ottomans in Europe (Turkey and Bulgaria) and to a lesser extent in the Vilayet of Aleppo. Following the massacres carried out by Circassian mercenaries in Bulgaria in 1876, in February 1878 Circassians were sent by boat from Greece and Macedonia to the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus, via Beirut, Acre (to Nablus) and Tripoli (to Homs). Some arrived in Amman at that time. Overall, 25,000 Circassians settled in southern Syria and about 15,000 settled near Aleppo in 1878 ( Lewis 1987, p. 98). Many died of malaria and chickenpox, those who survived had to adapt their farming methods to the dry climate of the Middle East. The Ottoman government exempted them from tax and granted them access to miri land, which they defended fiercely against the Bedouins.

18 In Jordan, the Circassians were responsible for border control and for developing agriculture on the steppe, where they created many new agricultural zones. They were supported by the Ottoman authorities and joined the ranks of the army, they later joined the troops of Emir Abdullah the 1 st in the Transjordan Frontier Force and the Arab Legion. In the early 1920s, out of a total population of 300,000, there were only 7,000 Caucasians (6,000 Circassians and 1,000 Chechens).

19 The first Chechens settled in Transjordan from 1902 in Zarqa, they subsequently founded Ruseifa in 1904, and Suweileh and Sukhnah in 1905. In March 1906, European sources estimated the number of Circassians to be 1,949 families in Qunaytra, 2,250 families in Transjordan, 670 families near Homs, 550 families in the vilayet of Beirut (including the Sanjaks of Latakia and Acre) and a total of 25,000 people in the Vilayets of Damascus and Beirut. After the creation of the Kingdom of Jordan in 1949, Amman had 640 families (Shabsugh and Kabarday groups), Wadi al-Sir had 370, Zarqa 790, Jerash 400, Naur 170, Suweileh 120, Sukhna 20 and Azraq Shishan 20 ( Lewis 1987, p. 116).


Videoni tomosha qiling: Beautiful voice recitation of quran By Idris al Hashemi. إدريس آل هاشيمي (Yanvar 2022).