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Natsist-sovet shartnomasi nima edi va bu Polshaga qanday ta'sir qildi?

Natsist-sovet shartnomasi nima edi va bu Polshaga qanday ta'sir qildi?

Natsist-sovet shartnomasi fashistlar Germaniyasi va SSSR o'rtasida hujum qilmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnoma edi. Molotov-Ribbentrop shartnomasi sifatida ham tanilgan bu shartnoma 1939 yil 23-avgustda Moskvada imzolangan. Nemislar 1941 yil 22-iyunda SSSRga bostirib kirib, shartnomani buzgunga qadar deyarli ikki yil amalda bo'lgan.

Pakt zamonaviy kuzatuvchilar uchun ajablanib bo'ldi. Natsistlar kommunizmdan, sovetlar fashizmdan nafratlanishardi. Xo'sh, nima uchun bu mafkuraviy qarama -qarshi kuchlar bunday kelishuvga kelishdi?

Birinchi fashist-sovet muzokaralari muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi

1933 yilda fashistlar partiyasi Germaniyada hokimiyatni qo'lga kiritdi va Gitler o'zining qurolli qurollanish dasturini amalga oshirishga kirishdi. Stalin natsistlarning tobora kuchayib borayotgan lideri bilan ittifoq tuzishni o'ylardi, lekin mafkuraviy tafovutlar bunga to'sqinlik qildi.

Dan Ikkinchi Jahon Urushining dastlabki bosqichlarida Gitler Germaniyasi va Stalin Rossiyasi o'rtasida paydo bo'lgan mash'um ittifoq haqida Uchinchi Reyx va Ikkinchi Jahon Urushining taniqli ingliz tarixchisi Rojer Murxaus bilan gaplashadi.

Hozir tinglang

Buning o'rniga Stalin g'arbiy liberal demokratik davlatlarga murojaat qildi va 1934 yil sentyabr oyida Millatlar Ligasiga qo'shildi. Liga a'zolari kommunizmga xuddi shunday qarshi chiqishdi, lekin ular SSSRni bo'lajak ittifoqchi fashistlar Germaniyasining har qanday tajovuziga qarshi ittifoq sifatida qabul qilishdi.

Stalin sabrsizlik qila boshladi

Ligaga qo'shilganiga qaramay, Stalin fashistlarni Sovetlarga qarshi sharqqa yurishga undagan Britaniya va Frantsiyaning tinchlantirish siyosatiga qarshi chiqdi.

1939 yilning bahorida Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiya tez orada Gitler bilan urush olib borishi mumkin edi va Stalin Germaniyaning harbiy tajovuzidan qo'rqardi. O'sha yilning aprel oyida Sovet tashqi ishlar vaziri Maksim Litvinov Buyuk Britaniya, Frantsiya va SSSR o'rtasida jamoaviy xavfsizlik to'g'risida shartnoma tuzishni taklif qildi.

Rossiya tashqi ishlar vaziri Vyacheslav Molotov (chapda) va Germaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri Yoaxim fon Ribbentrop (o'ngdan ikkinchi) 1939 yil 23 -avgustda shartnoma imzoladilar.

Tanlov oson edi: Stalin Gitler bilan ittifoqchi bo'lishni tanladi. Bu kelishuv fashist-sovet dushmanligining rasmiy tugashini ko'rsatdi. 1939 yil 23-avgustda Germaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri Yoaxim fon Ribbentrop va Rossiya tashqi ishlar vaziri Vyacheslav Molotov natsist-sovet paktini imzoladilar.

Polshaga nima bo'ldi?

Paktdagi maxfiy protokolda Germaniya va SSSR Polshani bo'linib, egallab olishlari va o'z ulushlarini o'z ta'sir doiralariga kiritishlari aytilgan edi. Keyinchalik fashistlar ham, sovetlar ham Polshaga bostirib kirishdi.

Germaniya 1939 yil 1 sentyabrda Polshaga bostirib kirdi va keyingi kampaniya halokatli edi, bomba hujumlari Polshaning tabiiy manzarasini vayron qildi.

Gitler nemis qo'shinlarining "sentyabr kampaniyasi" paytida Polshaga kirayotganini kuzatadi. Kredit: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-S55480 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

1939 yil 17 sentyabrda Qizil Armiya mamlakatga bostirib kirdi. Polsha olti hafta qarshilik ko'rsatishga qodir edi, 1939 yil 6 oktyabrda taslim bo'ldi.

Germaniya va SSSR keyinchalik Polshani alohida ishg'ol zonalariga bo'lishdi. SSSR Nar, Vistula va San daryolarining sharqidagi hududlarni, Germaniya esa Polshaning g'arbiy qismini qo'shib oldi. Natsistlar, shuningdek, Polshaning janubini Ukrainaning shimoliy qismlari bilan birlashtirib, fashistlar bosib olgan "Umumiy hukumat" ni tuzdilar.

Natijada

Shartnoma deyarli ikki yil o'z kuchida qoldi. 1941 yil 22 -iyunda fashistlar Germaniyasi "Barbarossa" operatsiyasini boshlagan va SSSRga bostirib kirganida, u bekor deb e'lon qilingan. Bu urushda hal qiluvchi burilish nuqtasi bo'ldi, chunki bu SSSRni fashistlar va o'qlar kuchlariga qarshi kurashda ittifoqchilarga qo'shilishiga olib keldi.

Rojer Murxaus - Uchinchi Reyx va Ikkinchi jahon urushi tarixchisi, "Gitler va Berlinni urushda o'ldirish" iblislar ittifoqining muallifi. Bu ajoyib epizodda u tarixdagi eng dahshatli dengiz halokati haqida gap boradi: 1945 yilda Vilgelm Gustloffning cho'kishi.

Hozir tinglang

Urush tugashi bilan Qizil Armiya yana Polshaga kirdi, faqat bu safar polyaklarni fashistlar bosqinidan ozod qilish edi.

Urushdan keyin ham Sovet hukumati Polshani bo'linish va bosib olish uchun maxfiy protokol mavjudligini inkor etishda davom etdi. Bu faqat 1989 yilda SSSR parchalanishi bilan ochilgan, tan olingan va qoralangan.


Sahifa variantlari

1939 yil 1 sentyabrda ertalabki soat 4.45 da nemis jangovar kemasi Shlesvig-Golshteyn Ikkinchi Jahon Urushining birinchi harbiy ishtiroki bo'lgan Dantsig (hozirgi Gdansk) Westerplatte Fortning Polsha garnizoniga o'q uzdi. Bir vaqtning o'zida 1300 samolyot tomonidan qo'llab -quvvatlangan 62 ta nemis diviziyasi Polshaga bostirib kira boshladi.

Adolf Gitlerning Polshaga bostirib kirish haqidagi qarori qimor edi. The Wehrmacht (Germaniya armiyasi) hali to'liq kuchga ega emas edi va Germaniya iqtisodiyoti hali ham tinchlik davridagi ishlab chiqarishga qulflangan edi. Shunday qilib, bosqin Gitler generallarini xavotirga solib, uning buyrug'iga qarshilik ko'rsatdi va uning urush rejalari Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiyaga tarqaldi.

Qaror. Polshaga bostirib kirish qimor edi.

Gitler generallari ehtiyot bo'lishga chaqirishdi va G'arbiy devorni himoya qilish uchun ko'proq vaqt talab qilishdi, chunki g'arbda Britaniya va Frantsiyaning har qanday qarshi hujumini to'xtatish uchun. Wehrmacht sharq bilan shug'ullangan. Biroq, ularning lideri ularning xavotirlarini inkor etib, ularning to'liq sadoqatini talab qildi.

Gitler Polshaga bostirib kirishi ikkita muhim sababga ko'ra qisqa, zafarli urush bilan yakunlanishiga ishonchi komil edi. Birinchidan, u dunyodagi birinchi zirhli korpusning joylashishi Polsha qurolli kuchlarini tezda mag'lub etishiga ishondi. blitskrieg haqoratli Ikkinchidan, u Britaniya va Frantsiya bosh vazirlari Nevill Chemberlen va Eduard Daladierni urushdan ko'ra tinchlik yo'li bilan hal qilishni afzal ko'radigan zaif rahbarlar deb baholadi.


Nega Gitler shartnomani xohladi?

Birinchi Jahon Urushida Germaniyaning ikki frontli urushda qatnashishi uning kuchlarini bo'linishiga olib keldi va ularning hujum kuchini zaiflashtirdi.

1939 yilda urushga tayyorgarlik ko'rar ekan, nemis diktatori Adolf Gitler o'sha xatolarni takrorlamaslikka qat'iy qaror qildi. U Polshani kuchsiz egallashga umid qilgan bo'lsa-da (u bir yil oldin Avstriyani qo'shib olgan edi), bosqinchilik natijasida ikki frontli urush ehtimolini kamaytirish zarurati aniq edi.

Sovet tarafidan, pakt 1939 yil avgust oyining boshlarida Britaniya-Sovet-Frantsiya uch tomonlama ittifoq tuzish bo'yicha muzokaralari buzilganidan keyin ro'y berdi. Rossiya manbalariga ko'ra, ittifoq Polsha va Ruminiya o'z hududlari bo'ylab Sovet harbiy kuchlarining o'tishini qabul qilishdan bosh tortgani uchun muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchragan. lekin Rossiya bosh vaziri Iosif Stalin Buyuk Britaniya bosh vaziri Nevill Chemberlenga va Angliyadagi konservativ partiyaga ishonmaganligi va ular Rossiya manfaatlarini to'liq qo'llab -quvvatlamasligiga ishongani ham haqiqat.

Shunday qilib, natsist-sovet tajovuz qilmaslik paktining muzokaralari boshlandi.


Tarkibi

1939 yil boshida, bosqindan bir necha oy oldin, Sovet Ittifoqi Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiya bilan Adolf Gitler davrida fashistlar Germaniyasining qulashiga qarshi strategik ittifoq muzokaralarini boshladi. 1939 yil avgustda SSSR Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiyaga "120 ta piyoda diviziyasi (har birida 19000 ga yaqin qo'shin), 16 otliq diviziyasi, 5000 ta og'ir artilleriya, 9500 ta tank va 5500 tagacha qiruvchi samolyot va bombardimonchilarni Germaniya chegaralariga yuborishni taklif qildi. ". [21] SSSR Germaniya bilan chegaradosh bo'lmaganligi uchun, bu, aslida, 1920 yilda Polsha -Sovet urushi bo'lgan Qizil Armiya tomonidan Polsha hududlarini ixtiyoriy ravishda bosib olishni anglatar edi. Muzokaralar muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi. [22]

Shartlar rad etilganligi sababli, Iosif Stalin Adolf Gitler bilan 1939 yil 23-avgustda imzolangan Molotov-Ribbentrop paktini tuzdi. Bu tajovuz qilmaslik to'g'risidagi pakt Shimoliy va Sharqiy Evropaning nemis va sovetlarga bo'linishini tuzuvchi maxfiy protokoldan iborat edi. urush paytida ta'sir doiralari. [23] Molotov -Ribbentrop shartnomasi imzolanganidan bir hafta o'tgach, nemis qo'shinlari 1939 yil 1 sentyabrda g'arbdan, shimoldan va janubdan Polshaga bostirib kirishdi. Polsha qo'shinlari asta -sekin janubi -sharqqa chekinishdi va u erda uzoq vaqt Ruminiya ko'prigi boshini himoya qilish uchun tayyorgarlik ko'rishdi. va ular frantsuz va inglizlar kutgan yordam va yordamni kutishdi, lekin na frantsuzlar, na inglizlar ularni qutqarishdi. 1939 yil 17 sentyabrda Sovet Qizil Armiyasi maxfiy protokolga muvofiq Kresy viloyatiga bostirib kirdi. [24] [7 -eslatma]

Harbiy harakatlarning ochilishida, Polshaning bir qancha shaharlari, shu jumladan Dubno, Tsuk va Vlodzimer Votsinskiy, Qizil Armiyani nemislarga qarshi kurashish uchun ketayotganiga amin bo'lishdi. Polsha armiyasi generali Yuliy Ramel ularga kech bo'lmaguncha ularga ittifoqdoshidek munosabatda bo'lishga ruxsat berilmagan buyruq berdi. [27] Sovet hukumati Polshaning sharqiy qismida yashagan ukrainlar va belaruslarni himoya qilish uchun harakat qilayotganini e'lon qildi, chunki Sovet targ'ibotiga ko'ra, Polsha davlati fashistlarning Germaniya hujumi natijasida qulab tushdi va endi kafolat bera olmadi. o'z fuqarolarining xavfsizligi. [28] [29] [30] [31] Ikkinchi jabhaga duch kelgan Polsha hukumati, Ruminiya ko'prigi boshini himoya qilishning iloji yo'q, degan xulosaga keldi va barcha forma kiygan qo'shinlarni o'sha paytdagi neytral Ruminiyaga favqulodda evakuatsiya qilishni buyurdi. [1]

Millatlar Ligasi va 1919 yildagi Parij tinchlik konferentsiyasining tinchlik shartnomalari, kutilganidek, Evropa etnik kelib chiqishi bo'yicha yarashish g'oyalarini ilgari surishga yordam bermadi. 100% aholisi bo'lgan Markaziy Evropada (Germaniya, Avstriya, Vengriya) epidemik millatchilik, qattiq siyosiy norozilik sirtdan Umumjahon aybdor deb topildi va mustamlakadan keyingi shovinizm (Italiya) g'azablangan revanshizm va hududiy ambitsiyalarga olib keldi. [32] Yozef Pilsudskiy Rossiya yoki Germaniya tomonidan bo'lajak imperialistik harakatlarga qarshi tura oladigan Polsha boshchiligidagi federatsiya tuzishga harakat qilib, Polsha chegaralarini iloji boricha sharqqa qadar kengaytirishga intildi. [33] 1920 yilga kelib bolsheviklar Rossiyadagi fuqarolar urushidan g'alaba qozonishdi va amalda hukumat va viloyat ma'muriyati ustidan mutlaq nazoratni qo'lga kiritishdi. Hamma xorijiy aralashuvlar qaytarilgach, Trotskiy va Stalin qo'mondonlik qilgan Qizil Armiya G'arbiy Evropadagi kommunistik harakatlarni rag'batlantirish niyatida g'arbiy tomonga tortila boshladi. [34] 1919 yildagi chegaradagi to'qnashuvlar asta -sekin avj oldi va oxir -oqibat 1920 yildagi Polsha -Sovet urushi bilan yakunlandi. [35] Polsha Varshava jangida g'alaba qozonganidan so'ng, Sovetlar tinchlik uchun sudga berishdi va urush 1920 yil oktyabr oyida sulh bilan yakunlandi. [36] Tomonlar 1921 yil 18 martda rasmiy tinchlik shartnomasi - "Riga tinchligi" ga imzo chekdilar, Polsha va Sovet Rossiyasi o'rtasidagi bahsli hududlarni bo'lishdi. [37] Urushlar oralig'ida asosan Sovet-Polsha chegarasini aniqlagan harakatda, sovetlar Polsha tinchlik delegatsiyasiga Rossiya imperiyasi va Polsha-Litva Hamdo'stligi o'rtasidagi chegaraga o'xshash bo'lgan bahsli chegaradosh hududlarda hududiy imtiyozlarni taklif qilishdi. 1772 yilning birinchi bo'linishi. [38] Tinchlik bitimidan so'ng, Sovet rahbarlari xalqaro kommunistik inqilob g'oyasidan qat'iy voz kechishdi va taxminan 20 yil kontseptsiyaga qaytishmadi. [39] Elchilar konferentsiyasi va xalqaro hamjamiyat (Litvadan tashqari) 1923 yilda Polshaning sharqiy chegaralarini tan oldi. [40] [41]

Shartnoma bo'yicha muzokaralar

1939 yil 15 martda nemis qo'shinlari Pragani egallab olishdi. Aprel o'rtalarida Sovet Ittifoqi, Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiya Germaniyaning potentsial tajovuziga qarshi siyosiy va harbiy bitim tuzish bo'yicha diplomatik takliflarni sota boshladilar. [42] [43] Polsha bu muzokaralarda qatnashmadi. [44] Uch tomonlama munozaralarda, agar Germaniya ekspansionizmi davom etsa, ishtirok etuvchi mamlakatlarga mumkin bo'lgan kafolatlar muhokama qilindi. [45] Sovetlar inglizlarga yoki frantsuzlarga jamoaviy xavfsizlik shartnomasini bajarishga ishonishmadi, chunki ular Ispaniya fuqarolar urushi paytida millatchilarga qarshi munosabat bildirishdan bosh tortishgan va Chexoslovakiyani bosib olish samarali qarshiliksiz amalga oshgan. Sovet Ittifoqi, shuningdek, Angliya va Frantsiya har qanday potentsial fashist-sovet mojarosi paytida chetda qolishga intilishidan shubhalanardi. [46] Biroq, Stalin o'z elchilari orqali 1936 yil boshida fashistlar Germaniyasi bilan maxfiy muzokaralar olib borgan va Robert C. Grogin (muallifi) Tabiiy dushmanlar), Gitler bilan o'zaro tushunish har doim uning afzal ko'rgan diplomatik echimi bo'lgan. [47] Sovet rahbari o'z ta'sir doirasidan mahrum bo'lishga kafolat bermas edi, [48] va hujum sodir bo'lgan taqdirda Finlyandiyadan Ruminiyaga qadar shimoliy-janubiy bufer zonasini yaratishga intildi. [49] [50] Sovetlar xavfsizlikka tahdid bo'lgan taqdirda bu mamlakatlarga kirish huquqini talab qilishdi. [51] Avgust oyining o'rtalarida boshlangan harbiy masalalar bo'yicha muzokaralar Germaniya hujumi sodir bo'lgan taqdirda Sovet qo'shinlarining Polsha orqali o'tishi mavzusida tezda to'xtab qoldi. Britaniya va Frantsiya rasmiylari Polsha hukumatiga Sovet shartlariga rozi bo'lishni talab qilishdi. [22] [52] Biroq, Polsha rasmiylari Qizil Armiya qo'shinlari Polsha tuprog'iga qadam qo'ysalar, ular ketish talablarini rad etishlari mumkinligi haqida jiddiy xavotir bildirgan holda, Sovet qo'shinlarining Polsha hududiga kirishiga qat'iyan rad etishdi. [53] Shunda Sovet amaldorlari Polshaning e'tirozlariga e'tibor bermaslik va uch tomonlama shartnomalar tuzishni taklif qilishdi. [54] Inglizlar bunday harakat Polshani Germaniya bilan mustahkam ikki tomonlama munosabatlar o'rnatishga undashidan qo'rqib, taklifni rad etishdi. [55]

Germaniya rasmiylari bir necha oydan buyon yashirincha Sovet kanallariga maslahatlar berib kelishgan, chunki Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiyaga qaraganda siyosiy kelishuvda yanada qulay shartlar taklif qilinadi. [56] Shu bilan birga, Sovet Ittifoqi fashistlar Germaniyasi bilan iqtisodiy bitim tuzish borasida muzokaralarni boshlagan, shu bilan birga uch tomonlama guruh a'zolari bilan muzokara olib borgan. [56] 1939 yil iyul oyining oxiri va avgust oyining boshlariga kelib, sovet va nemis diplomatlari rejalashtirilgan iqtisodiy kelishuv tafsilotlari to'g'risida deyarli to'liq konsensusga kelishdi va kerakli siyosiy kelishuv imkoniyatlarini muhokama qilishdi. [57] 1939 yil 19 -avgustda nemis va sovet amaldorlari 1939 yildagi nemis -sovet tijorat bitimini tuzdilar, bu o'zaro manfaatli iqtisodiy shartnoma bo'lib, u sovet xom ashyosini nemis qurol -yarog ', harbiy texnika va fuqarolik texnikasi bilan almashishni nazarda tutadi. Ikki kundan keyin Sovet Ittifoqi uch tomonlama harbiy muzokaralarni to'xtatdi. [56] [58] 24 -avgustda Sovet Ittifoqi va Germaniya Molotov -Ribbentrop paktida savdo bitimidan so'ng siyosiy va harbiy kelishuvlarni imzoladilar. Bu pakt o'zaro hujum qilmaslik shartlarini o'z ichiga olgan va maxfiy protokollarni o'z ichiga olgan bo'lib, ular shimoliy va sharqiy Evropa davlatlarini nemis va sovet ta'sir doiralariga bo'lish rejalarini tartibga solgan. Sovet sferasiga dastlab Latviya, Estoniya va Finlyandiya kirgan. [8 -eslatma] Germaniya va Sovet Ittifoqi Polshani bo'linadi. Pisa, Narev, Vistula va San daryolarining sharqidagi hududlar Sovet Ittifoqiga bo'ysunadi. Shartnomada, shuningdek, 1921 yilgi Rigadagi tinchlikda Polshaga berilgan hududlarni qaytarib olish imkoniyatini o'z ichiga olgan bosqinchilikda [25] Sovet ishtirokini loyihalari ko'zda tutilgan edi. Adolf Gitler bilan kelishmovchilik xavfisiz Polsha. [61] [62]

Germaniya-sovet shartnomasi imzolanganidan bir kun o'tib, frantsuz va ingliz harbiy delegatsiyalari zudlik bilan sovet harbiy muzokarachisi Kliment Voroshilov bilan uchrashishni so'rashdi. [63] 25 avgustda Voroshilov buni tan oldi "O'zgargan siyosiy vaziyatni hisobga olgan holda, suhbatni davom ettirishda hech qanday foydali maqsadga erishish mumkin emas." [63] Shu kuni, Britaniya va Polsha Britaniya-Polsha o'zaro yordam paktini imzoladilar. [64] Buyuk Britaniya Polsha suvereniteti va mustaqilligini himoya qilish va saqlash majburiyatini oladi. [64]

Gitler Angliya va Frantsiyani bo'lajak mojaroga aralashmaslikka ko'ndirishga harakat qildi va 1939 yil 26 avgustda taklif qildi Wehrmacht kelajakda Buyuk Britaniyada mavjud bo'lgan kuchlar. [65] 29 -avgust yarim tunda Germaniya Tashqi ishlar vaziri Yoaxim von Ribbentrop Buyuk Britaniya elchisi Nevil Xendersonga Polshaga nisbatan tinchlikni ta'minlaydigan shartlar ro'yxatini topshirdi. [66] Shartlarga ko'ra, Polsha Dansigni (Gdanskni) Germaniyaga topshirishi kerak edi va bir yil ichida 1919 yildagi rezidensiya va demografiyaga asoslangan Polsha koridorida plebisit (referendum) o'tkazilishi kerak edi. [66] 30 avgustda Ribbentrop bilan uchrashgan Polsha elchisi Lipski, bu talablarni yakka o'zi tasdiqlashga vakolati yo'qligini aytganda, Ribbentrop uni ishdan bo'shatdi [67] va uning xorijiy idorasi Polsha Germaniya taklifini rad etganini e'lon qildi. Polsha bilan muzokaralar to'xtatildi. [68] 31 -avgustda soxta bayroq operatsiyasida nemis bo'linmalari o'zlarini Polshaning oddiy qo'shinlari sifatida ko'rsatib, Sleziyaning chegaradosh Gleyvits shahri yaqinida Gleyvits voqeasini uyushtirdilar. [69] [70] Ertasi kuni (1 sentyabr) Gitler Polshaga qarshi rasmiy harbiy harakatlar ertalabki soat 4:45 da boshlanganini e'lon qildi [67] Germaniya havo kuchlari Lvov va Suk shaharlarini bombardimon qildi. [71] Polsha xavfsizlik xizmati xodimlari Lvov va Przemyslda Ukraina ziyolilari orasida hibsga olishlarni amalga oshirdilar. [71]

1939 yil 1 sentyabrda Moskva vaqti bilan soat 11:00 da Germaniyaning Moskvadagi elchixonasi maslahatchisi Gustav Xilger Xalq Tashqi ishlar komissarligiga keldi va Germaniya -Polsha urushining boshlanishi, Dansig (Gdansk) qo'shilishi haqida rasman e'lon qildi. u OKL Bosh shtabi boshlig'ining Minskdagi radiostansiya signalni qo'llab -quvvatlashini so'ragan. [72] Sovet tomoni talabga qisman rioya qildi. [72] O'sha kuni Sovet Ittifoqi Oliy Kengashining navbatdan tashqari sessiyasi uning qabul qilinganligini tasdiqladi "17 yosh va 8 oylik erkaklar uchun umumiy harbiy majburiyat to'g'risidagi qonun", 1937 yildagi xizmat hujjati loyihasi yana bir yilga uzaytirildi. [72] Bundan tashqari, Kommunistik partiya Siyosiy byurosi Xalq mudofaa komissarligi taklifini ma'qulladi, u Qizil Armiyaning 51 ta miltiq bo'linmasini 6000 kishidan iborat 76 ta miltiq bo'linmasi bilan to'ldirishini nazarda tutgan edi. tog 'bo'linmalari va 3000 kishidan iborat yana 33 oddiy miltiq diviziyasi. [72]

1939 yil 2 sentyabrda Shimoliy Germaniya armiyasi guruhi "Polsha koridorini" [72] himoya qilgan Polsha (Pomorze Armiyasi) kuchlarini o'rab olish uchun manevrani amalga oshirdi, natijada Polsha qo'mondoni general Vladislav Bortnovskiy o'z bo'linmalari bilan aloqani yo'qotdi. . [72] Germaniya qo'shinlari guruhining zirhli kontingentlari Tszstoxova shahri yaqinida, Katovitsaning janubidagi Polshaning 6-piyoda diviziyasini mag'lub etishga intildi, u erda Germaniya 5-zirhli diviziyasi yonilg'i omborlarini egallab oldi. uskunalar omborlari. [72] Sharqda Germaniya 14 -armiyasining 18 -korpusining bo'linmalari Polsha -Slovakiya chegarasini Dukla dovoni yaqinida kesib o'tishdi. [72] Sovet Ittifoqi hukumati tomonidan tasdiqlangan 1355-279ss-sonli ko'rsatma chiqarildi "1939-1940 yillardagi Qizil Armiya quruqlik qo'shinlarini qayta tashkil etish rejasi"[72], bo'linishning batafsil o'tkazilishini va bo'lajak Qizil Armiya 173 bo'linmasining hududiy joylashish rejalarini tartibga solgan. [72] Qayta tashkil etilgan piyodalarga qo'shimcha ravishda, korpus artilleriyasi va Oliy Oliy qo'mondonlik artilleriya zaxirasi ko'paytirildi, shu bilan birga xizmat bo'linmalari, orqa qismlar va muassasalar soni kamaytirilishi kerak edi. [72] 2 sentyabr oqshomida Polsha -Sovet chegarasida mudofaa va xavfsizlik choralari kuchaytirildi. [72] Belorusiya harbiy okrugidagi chegara qo'shinlari qo'mondonining 1720-sonli buyrug'iga binoan, barcha otryadlar doimiy jangovar tayyor holatga keltirildi. [72]

Ittifoqdosh Britaniya va Frantsiya hukumatlari 3 sentyabrda Germaniyaga urush e'lon qilishdi, lekin na kelishilgan harbiy harakatni boshladilar, na Polshaga jiddiy yordam ko'rsatdilar. [73] [74] Polshaning mahalliy chegara janglarida erishgan yutuqlariga qaramay, Germaniyaning texnik, operativ va raqamli ustunligi oxir -oqibat Polshaning barcha kuchlarini chegaradan Varshava va Lvovdagi mudofaa chizig'iga qadar chekinishni talab qildi. Xuddi shu kuni (3 sentyabr) Berlindagi yangi Sovet elchisi Aleksey Shkvartsev Adolf Gitlerga ishonch yorlig'ini topshirdi. [72] Boshlanish marosimi paytida Shkvartsev va Gitler bir-birlariga tajovuz qilmaslik to'g'risidagi bitim shartlarini bajarishga sodiq ekanliklariga ishontirishdi. [72] Tashqi ishlar vaziri Yoaxim von Ribbentrop Germaniyaning Moskvadagi elchixonasiga Sovet Ittifoqining Qizil Armiyaning Polshaga bostirib kirish niyati ehtimoli haqidagi hisobotini topshirdi. [72]

1939 yil 4 sentyabrda Atlantika okeanining shimoliy qismidagi nemis flotining barcha bo'linmalari "eng shimoliy yo'nalish orqali Murmanskka borishni" buyurdilar. [72] O'sha kuni Kommunistik partiya markaziy qo'mitasi va Sovet Ittifoqi hukumati Xalq mudofaa komissari Kliment Voroshilovning Qizil Armiya xodimlari va yosh qo'mondonlarini nafaqaga chiqarish va ishdan bo'shatish haqidagi buyrug'ini tasdiqladi. Leningrad, Moskva, Xarkov, Belorussiya va Kiev harbiy okrugidagi barcha havo mudofaasi otryadlari va xodimlari uchun keng ko'lamli mashg'ulotlar. [72]

1939 yil 5 sentyabrda Tashqi ishlar xalq komissari Vyacheslav Molotov Germaniya elchisi Fridrix Verner fon der Shulenburgni qabul qildi. [72] Elchining Qizil Armiyani Polshaga joylashtirishi mumkinligi haqidagi so'roviga Molotov Sovet hukumati javob berdi. "aniq harakatlarni boshlash kerak" kerakli vaqtda. "Ammo biz bu moment hali kelmaganiga ishonamiz" va "Har qanday shoshma -shosharlik vaziyatni buzishi va raqiblarning yig'ilishini osonlashtirishi mumkin.". [72]

10 sentyabrda Polsha bosh qo'mondoni marshal Edvard Ridz-Emigliy general-janubi-sharqda Ruminiya ko'prigi boshiga chekinishni buyurdi. [75] Ko'p o'tmay, fashist nemis amaldorlari o'z sovet hamkasblarini kelishilgan qismini qo'llab-quvvatlashga va sharqdan Polshaga hujum qilishga undadilar. Molotov va elchi fon der Shulenburg bu masalani qayta -qayta muhokama qildilar, ammo Sovet Ittifoqi Polsha sharqiga bostirib kirishni kechiktirdi, shu bilan birga Uzoq Sharqda Yaponiya bilan davom etayotgan chegara bahslari bilan bog'liq voqealar bilan band edi. Sovet Ittifoqi Qizil Armiyani safarbar qilish uchun vaqt kerak edi va Polsha parchalanib ketganidan keyin hujumni kutishning diplomatik afzalliklaridan foydalandi. [76] [77]

14 sentyabrda, Polsha qulashi yaqinida, Sovet matbuotida Polsha bilan ziddiyat haqidagi birinchi bayonotlar paydo bo'ldi. [78] Xalxin Gol janglarida Sovet Ittifoqi va Yaponiya imperiyasi o'rtasida e'lon qilinmagan urush 15 sentyabrda sulh 16 sentyabrda kuchga kirgan Molotov -Tojo bitimi bilan yakunlandi. [79] [78] 17 sentyabrda Molotov Polshaning Moskvadagi elchisi Vatslav Grjibovskiyga urush e'lon qildi:

Varshava, Polsha poytaxti sifatida, endi yo'q. Polsha hukumati parchalanib ketdi va endi hech qanday ishorani ko'rsatmadi. Bu shuni anglatadiki, Polsha davlati va uning hukumati amalda o'z faoliyatini to'xtatdi. Shunga ko'ra, SSSR va Polsha o'rtasida tuzilgan bitimlar o'z kuchini yo'qotdi. O'z ixtiyorida qolgan va etakchilikdan mahrum bo'lgan Polsha SSSR uchun xavf tug'dirishi mumkin bo'lgan har xil xavf va kutilmagan hodisalar uchun mos maydonga aylandi. Shu sabablarga ko'ra, shu paytgacha betaraf bo'lgan Sovet hukumati endi neytral munosabatni saqlay olmaydi va bu faktlarga e'tibor bermaydi. . Bunday sharoitda Sovet hukumati Qizil Armiya Oliy qo'mondonligiga qo'shinlarni chegarani kesib o'tishni va G'arbiy Ukraina va G'arbiy Belorussiya aholisi hayoti va mulkini o'z himoyasiga olishni buyurdi. - SSSR tashqi ishlar xalq komissari V. Molotov, 1939 yil 17 sentyabr [80]

Molotov ommaviy radioeshittirish orqali Sovet Ittifoqi va Polsha o'rtasidagi barcha shartnomalar bekor bo'lganini, Polsha hukumati o'z xalqidan voz kechganini e'lon qildi, chunki Polsha davlati amalda o'z faoliyatini to'xtatdi. [31] [81] O'sha kuni Qizil Armiya Polsha chegarasini kesib o'tdi. [1] [76]


Polshalar alohida: Putin, Polsha va fashist-sovet pakti

Jeffri Roberts - Irlandiya milliy universiteti, Kork universiteti kollejining tarix faxriy professori. Uning so'nggi kitobi (Marin Folli va Oleg Rjheshevskiy hammualliflari) Cherchill va Stalin: Ikkinchi Jahon urushi paytida qurolli o'rtoqlar.

Ikkinchi Jahon urushi tugaganining 75 yilligi yaqinlashganda, urushning asosiy qurbonlari Polsha va Rossiyaning ikki qurboni uning kelib chiqishi haqida yana bir bor hissiy tortishuvlarga kirishdi. 1939 yil 23-avgustdagi fashist-sovet paktining ko'p yillik bahslari masalaning markazida.

Polemikani prezident Vladimir Putin 19-dekabr kuni Moskvada bo'lib o'tgan matbuot anjumanida Evropa parlamenti va Ikkinchi jahon urushi boshlanganining 80 yilligi to'g'risidagi rezolyutsiya haqida so'raganida boshlagan. Putin rezolyutsiyani qabul qilinmaydi deb hisobladi, chunki u Sovet Ittifoqi va fashistlar Germaniyasini tenglashtirdi va uning mualliflarini kinoyasiz va tarixdan bexabarlikda aybladi. U 1938 yil sentyabrdagi Myunxen shartnomasi va Chexoslovakiyani parchalashda Polshaning ishtirokini ta'kidladi. Sovet-Germaniya hujum qilmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnoma Gitler tomonidan boshqa davlatlar bilan tuzilgan yagona bitim emas edi. Ha, dedi Putin, Polshani Germaniya va SSSR o'rtasida bo'linadigan maxfiy protokollar bor edi, lekin Sovet qo'shinlari Polsha hukumati qulagandan keyingina kirgan.

Putin bu kabi dalillar bilan birinchi marta chiqishayotgani yo'q. U shunga o'xshash ko'plab fikrlarni 2009 yilda urush boshlanganining 70 yilligida aytgan. Ammo uning ohanglari jangovar emas, balki yarashtiruvchi edi. Putin Gdanskda o'tkazilgan xotira marosimida polyaklar va ruslarning umumiy kurashini ta'kidlab, urushning boshlanishini uning murakkabligi va xilma -xilligini ko'rib chiqishga chaqirdi. Faqat Sovet Ittifoqi emas, balki har bir mamlakat aybdor edi: & ldquoit, 1934 yildan 1939 yilgacha natsistlarni turli kelishuvlar va bitimlar bilan tinchlantirishga qilingan barcha urinishlar axloqiy jihatdan nomaqbul, amalda ma'nosiz, zararli va xavfli ekanligini tan olish kerak. & Rdquo

Polshaning o'sha paytdagi bosh vaziri Donald Tusk Putinga javoban, 1939 yil 1 sentyabrda uning mamlakatiga Germaniya hujum qilganini, keyin esa ikki hafta o'tib Sovet Ittifoqi tomonidan bosib olinganini ta'kidladi. Ammo Tusk ta'kidlaganidek, & ldquotruth og'riqli bo'lishi mumkin, lekin u hech kimni kamsitmasligi kerak. & Rdquo

Putin Moskvadagi matbuot anjumanidan bir kun o'tib, Sankt -Peterburgda, 75 yillik yubileyga tayyorgarlik masalasini muhokama qilish uchun yig'ilishda Mustaqil Davlatlar Hamdo'stligi rahbarlariga murojaat qildi. Putin bu imkoniyatdan foydalanib, 1939 yil sentyabr oyida urush boshlanishiga nima sabab bo'lganini, shu jumladan ko'plab diplomatik hujjatlardan batafsil iqtiboslarni keltirdi.

1938 yil sentyabr oyida Berlindagi Polsha elchisi Yozef Lipskiyning Gitler bilan suhbati haqida xabar yuborgani Putin va rsquosning e'tiborini tortdi. Suhbat chog'ida Gitler yahudiylar muammosini koloniyaga hijrat qilish orqali hal qilishni o'ylayotganini aytdi. Lipski, agar Gitler yahudiylar savoliga yechim topsa, polyaklar unga Varshavada chiroyli haykal o'rnatadi, deb javob berdi. & ldquoGitler bilan bunday suhbatni o'tkazadiganlar qanday odamlar? & quot, - so'radi Putin. Xuddi shunday, u Evropani fashistlardan ozod qilgan sovet askarlari qabrlari va yodgorliklarini tahqirlaganlardan qo'rqdi.

Britaniya va Frantsiya, Germaniya, Polsha va Sovet arxivlari orqali Putin va rsquosning asosiy maqsadi 1930-yillarda barcha davlatlar fashistlar bilan ish olib borganligini ko'rsatish edi. ittifoq. Putin bu tarixni hozirgi siyosat bilan bog'ladi: & ldquoRussiya odamlarni qo'rqitish uchun ishlatiladi. Chor bo'lsin, sovet bo'lsin yoki bugun & rsquos & ndash hech narsa o'zgarmadi. Rossiyaning qanday mamlakat ekanligi muhim emas & ndash mantiqiy qoladi. & Rdquo

1930 -yillarda Putin Sovet tashqi siyosatini qattiq himoya qildi. Rossiya prezidentining so'zlariga ko'ra, Moskva Gitlerga qarshi kollektiv xavfsizlik ittifoqini qidirdi, lekin uning sa'y -harakatlari qaytarildi, eng muhimi, 1938 yilgi Chexoslovakiya inqirozi paytida, Sovetlar mamlakat mudofaasi uchun urushga tayyor bo'lganda, Frantsiya ham shunday qilgan bo'lsa. Ammo frantsuzlar o'z harakatlarini polyaklar bilan bog'lashdi va Varshava Chexoslovakiya hududini egallab olish uchun astoydil harakat qildi. Putinning fikricha, agar 1938 yilda davlatlar Gitlerga qarshilik ko'rsatganida, Ikkinchi Jahon Urushining oldini olish mumkin edi.

Natsist-sovet shartnomasiga ko'ra, Putin maxfiy protokol borligini tan olganida, G'arbiy davlatlar arxivida Gitler bilan tuzilgan maxfiy bitimlar bo'lishi mumkinligini aytdi. U, shuningdek, Sovet Ittifoqi Polshaga haqiqatan ham bostirib kirmaganini yana bir bor ta'kidlab, Qizil Armiya va rsquos harakati ko'plab yahudiylarni natsistlar tomonidan yo'q qilinishidan qutqardi, deb qo'shimcha qildi.

Putin 24-dekabr kuni Rossiya va Rossiya Mudofaa vazirligi kengashining yig'ilishida urush va rsquo mavzusiga qaytdi: "Ha, Molotov-Ribbentrop paktiga imzo chekildi va ta'sir doiralarini belgilaydigan maxfiy protokol ham bor edi. Ammo Evropa davlatlari bundan oldin nima qilar edilar? Xuddi shu. Ularning hammasi bir xil ishlarni qilishgan & rdquo. Ammo unga eng qattiq ta'sir qilgan narsa, hamkasblariga aytganidek, Lipskiyning hisoboti edi: & ldquoBu ahmoq! Bu antisemit cho'chqa va ndashda menda boshqa so'z yo'q & rdquo.

Putin uchun adolatli bo'lish uchun, uning Polshaga va g'arbga ishora qilishdan ko'ra, uning tarixga bo'lgan qarashlari ko'proq. U, shuningdek, Ikkinchi Jahon Urushining chuqurroq sabablarini, shu jumladan Germaniyada radikal va revanxistik kayfiyat va rdquoni rag'batlantiruvchi Versal tinchlik shartnomasi va ko'plab mojarolarni keltirib chiqargan yangi davlatlar yaratilishini, xususan, Chexoslovakiyada 3,5 mln. -kuchli nemis ozligi.

Polsha va rsquosning Putin va rsquos g'azablangan filipplarga birinchi javobi, uning tashqi ishlar vazirligining 21 dekabrdagi bayonoti bo'lib, u Rossiya prezidentining bayonotlariga ishonmasligini bildirdi. Tashqi ishlar vazirligining so'zlariga ko'ra, Polsha 1930-yillarda Germaniya va Sovet Ittifoqiga nisbatan muvozanatli siyosat olib borgan va har ikki davlat bilan tajovuz qilmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnomalarni imzolagan. & ldquoPolsha Respublikasi olib borayotgan tinch siyosatga qaramay, Sovet Ittifoqi urush boshlash uchun to'g'ridan-to'g'ri qadamlar qo'ydi va shu bilan birga keng ko'lamli jinoyatlar sodir etdi.

According the Polish foreign ministry the crucial chronology of events was that in January 1939 the Germans made their claims against Poland in mid-April the Soviet ambassador offered Berlin political co-operation and at the end of April Hitler repudiated the German-Polish non-aggression pact in August the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed in September Germany and the USSR invaded Poland and then signed a Boundary and Friendship Treaty that formalised Poland&rsquos partition.

Among Soviet crimes against Poland was the mass repression of Poles in the territories occupied by the Red Army, including 107,000 arrests, 380, 000 deportations and, in spring 1940, 22,000 executions of Polish POWs and officials at Katyn and other murder sites.

On 29 December 2019 Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, issued a statement, noting that Poland was the war&rsquos first victim, &ldquothe first to experience the armed aggression of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and the first that fought in defense of a free Europe.&rdquo The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was not a non-aggression agreement but a military and political alliance of two dictators and their totalitarian regimes. &ldquoWithout Stalin&rsquos complicity in the partitioning of Poland, and without the natural resources that Stalin supplied to Hitler, the Nazi German crime machine would not have taken control of Europe. Thanks to Stalin, Hitler could conquer new countries with impunity, imprison Jews from all over the continent in ghettos and prepare the Holocaust&rdquo.

Morawiecki pulled no punches in relation to Putin: &ldquoPresident Putin has lied about Poland on numerous occasions, and he has always done so deliberately.&rdquo According to Morawiecki, Putin&rsquos &ldquoslander&rdquo was designed to distract attention from political setbacks suffered by the Russian President, such as US sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 oil pipeline project and the World Anti-Doping Agency&rsquos banning of Russia from international sporting events for four years.

All states like to present themselves as victims rather than perpetrators and this not the first time Poland and Russia have clashed over the Nazi-Soviet pact. The piquancy of the polemics is obviously related to the dire state of Russian-Western relations and to the presence in Warsaw of a radical nationalist government.

But how should we evaluate the historical content of these exchanges? My first book, published in 1989 on the 50th anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet pact, was The Unholy Alliance: Stalin&rsquos Pact with Hitler. Since then I have written many more books and articles about the Nazi-Soviet pact. My research has led me to conclude that Putin is broadly right in relation to the history of Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s but deficient in his analysis of the Nazi-Soviet pact.

After Hitler came to power in 1933 the Soviets did strive for collective security alliances to contain Nazi aggression and expansionism. Moscow did stand by Czechoslovakia in 1938 and was prepared to go war with Germany.

After Munich the Soviets retreated into isolation but Hitler&rsquos occupation of Prague in March 1939 presented an opportunity to relaunch their collective security campaign. In April Moscow proposed an Anglo-Soviet-French triple alliance that would guarantee the security of all European states under threat from Hitler, including Poland.

Some historians have questioned the sincerity of Moscow&rsquos triple alliance proposal but extensive evidence from the Soviet archives shows that it was Stalin&rsquos preferred option until quite late in the day. The problem was that Britain and France dragged their feet during the negotiations and as war grew closer so did Stalin doubts about the utility of a Soviet-Western alliance. Fearful the Soviet Union would be left to fight Hitler alone while Britain and France stood on the sidelines, Stalin decided to do a deal with Hitler -that kept the USSR out of the coming war and provided some guarantees for Soviet security.

The Soviets were not as proactive as they might have been in trying to persuade the British and French to accept their proposals. Some scholars argue this was because the Soviets were busy wooing the Germans. However, until August 1939 all the approaches came from the German side, which was desperate to disrupt the triple alliance negotiations. The political overture of April 1939 mentioned in the Polish foreign ministry statement is a case in point: the initiative came from the Germans not the Soviets.

One state that Moscow did actively pursue in 1939 was Poland. The bad blood in Soviet-Polish relations notwithstanding, after Munich the two states attempted to improve relations. When Hitler turned against Poland in spring 1939 Moscow made many approaches to Warsaw, trying to persuade the Poles to sign up to its triple alliance project. But Warsaw did not want or think it needed an alliance with the USSR given that it had the backing of Britain and France.

The failure of this incipient Polish-Soviet détente sealed the fate of the triple alliance negotiations, which broke down when the British and French were unable to guarantee Warsaw&rsquos consent to the entry of the Red Army into Poland in the event of war with Germany.

After the signature of the Nazi-Soviet pact there was extensive political, economic and military co-operation between the Soviet Union and Germany. Most people see this as a tactical manoeuvre by Stalin to gain time to prepare for a German attack. However, I have argued that in 1939-1940 Stalin contemplated the possibility of long-term co-existence with Nazi Germany.

Putin makes the point that Stalin did not sully himself with meeting Hitler, unlike British, French and Polish leaders. True, but Stalin received Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop twice - in August and September 1939 - and in November 1940 he sent his foreign minister, Molotov, to Berlin to negotiate a new Nazi-Soviet pact with Hitler. It was the failure of those negotiations that set Soviet-German relations on the path to war.

The first clause of the secret protocol attached to the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty concerned the Baltic states. Throughout the triple alliance negotiations Moscow&rsquos major security concern was a German military advance across the Baltic coastal lands to Leningrad. With the signature of the Nazi-Soviet pact that Baltic door to German expansion was locked by a spheres of influence agreement that allocated Latvia, Estonia and Finland to the Soviet sphere. Lithuania remained in Germany&rsquos sphere but was transferred to the Soviets in September 1939.

It was the second clause of the protocol that divided Poland into Soviet and German spheres but this should not be seen as a definite decision to partition Poland, though that possibility was certainly present. The protocol limited German expansion into Poland but did not specify the two states would annex their spheres of influence. The actions of both states in that respect would be determined by the course of the German-Polish war. In the event, Poland was rapidly crushed by the Germans, while the British and French did little to aid their ally except declare war on Germany. It was in those circumstances that Berlin pressed the Soviets to occupy Eastern Poland. Stalin was not ready, politically or militarily, to take that step but he knew that if the Red Army did not occupy the territory then the Wehrmacht would.

Putin glosses over the fact that the Red Army&rsquos entry into Poland was a massive military operation involving a half million troops. Large-scale clashes with Polish forces were averted only because Poland&rsquos commander-in-chief ordered his troops not to fire on Red Army. Even so, the Red Army suffered 3000 casualties including a thousand dead.

Often accused of parroting the Soviet line, Putin did not invoke the most potent argument that Moscow used to rationalise its attack on Poland, which was that the Red Army was entering the country to liberate Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine.

Poland&rsquos eastern territories had been secured as a result of the Russo-Polish war of 1919-1920. These territories lay east of the Curzon Line &ndash the ethnographical frontier between Russia and Poland demarcated at Versailles. The majority of the population were Jews, Belorussians and Ukrainians and many welcomed the Red Army as liberators from Polish rule. Such enthusiasm did not outlast the violent process of sovietisation through which the occupied territories were incorporated into the USSR as part of a unified Belorussia and a unified Ukraine.

During the Second World War Stalin insisted that the Curzon Line would be the border between Poland and the USSR &ndash a position that was eventually accepted by Britain and the United States. As compensation for its territorial losses Poland was given East Prussia and other parts of Germany. The result of this transfer was the brutal displacement of millions of Germans from their ancestral lands.

History is rarely as simple as polemicizing politicians would like it to be. Both sides of the Russo-Polish dispute have some valid arguments neither has a monopoly of what is a bitter truth. The Nazi-Soviet pact is a fact but so is Polish collaboration with Hitler in the 1930s. The Soviet Union did cooperate with Nazi Germany but it also played the main role in the defeat of Hitler. Stalin was responsible for vast mass repressions but he was not a racist or genocidal dictator and nor was he a warmonger. The Red Army&rsquos invasion of Eastern Poland was reprehensible but it also unified Belorussia and Ukraine. During the Second World War the Red Army was responsible for many atrocities but it did not commit mass murder and it did, together with its allies, liberate Europe from the Nazis.

Politicians will always use the past for political purposes. But in 2009 Putin came quite close to a balanced view about the Nazi-Soviet pact, as did Tusk in his measured rejoinder. Let&rsquos hope that Poland and Russia can find their way back to such middle ground.

The victory over Nazi Germany required enormous sacrifices by both countries. Surely it is possible to celebrate this common victory with dignity and with respect for differences about its complicated history.


How Stalin and Hitler Carved Up Poland (And Changed History Forever)

The nonagression pact paved the way for both countries to focus on domesic and expansionist priorities.

Asosiy nuqta: Niether country trusted each other. But they also wanted to give themselves time to attend to other matters (and build up militarily).

On August 23, 1939, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, V.P. Potemkin, waited at the Moscow Airport for Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of Nazi Germany. He warmly greeted the former champagne salesman and then whisked him away for a clandestine meeting at the Kremlin.

Waiting to receive the emissary were Soviet strongman Josef Stalin and his granite-faced foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov. They concluded what became known as the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. Included were provisions governing the transfer of raw materials from the Soviet Union in exchange for manufactured goods from Germany. But, more importantly, the pact was a protocol establishing each signatory’s sphere of influence. This included Poland. Hitler and Stalin did not merely intend to partition their neighbor, they meant to wipe the country off the map. The Germans would begin to close the vise on September 1, advancing to Brest-Litovsk. The Soviets would close the eastern jaws on September 17 until Poland was gobbled up. As an added inducement for Stalin’s compliance, Hitler agreed that Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Bessarabia, which was on the eastern edge of Romania, would be included in the Soviet sphere of influence.

This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.

The pact was signed at 2 am on the 24th. The two dictators not only sealed Poland’s fate but set in motion a chain of events that would soon engulf the globe in World War II.

Bottles of champagne were opened to toast the historic moment. Stalin raised his glass to Hitler’s health. “A fine fellow,” remarked the Soviet dictator. Yet, 21 months later the pact would prove to be just another scrap of paper, for Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union would collide in a titanic struggle that was to become the greatest land war in history.

The Rise of Fascism, the Decline of the Allied Powers

By 1939, Italy, once in the Allied camp, was now a Fascist power under the sway of a swaggering brute named Benito Mussolini. Another former Allied power, Japan, was now militaristic, a self-serving belligerent selling itself to the masses of Asia as their deliverer from the bondage of the white man, while masking the brutal reality of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The United States seemed hopelessly absorbed in its delusion of self-quarantine and was determined not to mire itself in European politics.

This left Britain and France. Heart and soul of the Allied effort during the Great War, they were able to maintain the façade as power brokers at Versailles but emerged from the four-year contest of attrition as had many of their soldiers—as permanent invalids. And while they were hardly terminal, their economies were still unwell, playing host to cankers of damage and debt in addition to being socially scarred from the unremitting bloodletting of the trenches, they hobbled along for the next 10 years until the Great Depression.

France, in particular, never seemed to emerge from either. Indeed, it seemed to seek solace in a bunker mentality induced by the Maginot Line, that impenetrable shield of France, a marvel of 20th-century construction with its underground railways, air conditioning system, and fixed fortifications which proved little better than monuments during the coming era of mobile warfare.

Hitler seemed to sense the weakness, testing the waters on March 7, 1936, with his occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland in direct contravention of the spirit of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties.

Common belief holds that the French reaction or lack thereof to the German provocation was owing to a lack of intestinal fortitude, girded by nightmares of Verdun. A policy memorandum of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden dated March 8, 1936, shows the British government counseling diplomatic action, urging the French not to scale up to a military riposte to which French Foreign Minister Pierre Flandin stated that France would not act alone. Rather, Paris would take the matter to the League of Nations.

There is, however, another side to this story: the lingering effect of the Great Depression. The French were concerned with their economy and currency. They desperately needed investors like Britain and, in particular, the United States to help bolster the franc. Foreign investment in the franc was hardly possible if Paris was mobilizing for war.

Hitler had won his game of brinkmanship. With just a couple of untried battalions, he had faced down 100 French divisions, throwing cold water on the doubts of his nervous generals and sending his stature soaring among masses of the German people while exposing the fragility of Anglo-French cohesion and the debility of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties.

Chipping Away at the European Security Order

Such trysts of gamesmanship played by an opportunistic Hitler brought Europe to the brink. His understanding of history spurred him to isolate that colossal power to the East, Soviet Russia. The Hitler-Stalin honeymoon fractured the European balance of power, removed the Red Army as a counterweight to German ambitions, compromised Moscow’s membership in the League of Nations, and revisited British and French ostracizing of the Soviet colossus from European politics at Versailles.

Adolf Hitler assumed the chancellorship of Germany on January 30, 1933. He relied on diplomacy to advance the interests of Germany because he lacked the military muscle for a more belligerent posture. For instance, he ended the clandestine Soviet-German military cooperation of the 1920s. Yet on May 5, Germany and the Soviet Union renewed the 1926 Treaty of Berlin. On January 26, 1934, Hitler signed a nonaggression pact with Poland. On September 18, 1934, the Soviets joined the League of Nations, Germany having withdrawn from the diplomatic fraternity the previous October.

By forging a nonaggression pact with Poland, Hitler prevented Warsaw and Paris from reaching an agreement that would have sandwiched a prostrate Germany and blocked any potential deal between Warsaw and Moscow. This, of course, raised serious doubts in the Kremlin as to German-Polish intentions. The idea of collective security proved attractive, hence Moscow’s long overdue membership in the League.

Yet, by the Spanish Civil War it was abundantly clear that Rome and Berlin intended to spread the Fascist creed like a plague across Europe. German and Italian involvement in Spain’s conflict, in the face of British and French neutrality, seemed another step toward the eventual isolation of the Soviet Union. Moscow, then, threw its support to the Republicans against Francisco Franco’s Nationalists. For Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia, the contentious Iberian Peninsula offered that battlefield laboratory for new weapons and tactics in preparation for the main event that was sure to come.

Five years after assuming power, Hitler felt more confident, having successfully affected the Anschluss with his homeland Austria on March 13, 1938, followed seven months later by adding the Sudetenland to the Reich from a friendless Czechoslovakia. Too late did the British and French understand the meaning of “no more territorial claims” when Hitler snatched Bohemia and Moravia on March 14-15, 1939, helping to complete the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

Thus the stage was set for the run-up to world war.

The “White” Directive

By March 16, 1939, Hitler had positioned Poland squarely between the German jaws of East Prussia to the north and the satellite state of Slovakia to the south. He now controlled the vaunted Skoda Works and added Czech tanks and guns to the Wehrmacht. Romania and Yugoslavia, arms customers of the Czechs, now had another supplier following Berlin’s hostile takeover. However, Hitler was not resting on his laurels.

On March 19, a “request” was forwarded to Vilnius. Lithuania was to hand over Memelland, which it had occupied since 1923, to the Reich and do so without delay. Four days later, Lithuania complied.

On March 21, Ribbentrop hosted the Polish ambassador, Josef Lipski, in Berlin. Hitler’s huckster urged the Polish diplomat to accept the deal offered the previous October. Danzig was to be returned to the Reich, a deal that included road and rail connections across the Polish Corridor. In return, Hitler would recognize the Corridor and Poland’s western borders. To sweeten the deal, territory was promised at Ukraine’s expense, a carrot to be finalized at some later date.

Lipski took the German offer back to Warsaw. He returned to Berlin on the 25th armed with Colonel Joseph Beck’s reply. The Polish Foreign Minister understood the machinations of the Führer. Caving in now would only invite another set of demands. Beck rebuffed Hitler’s offer, intimating that continued German pressure over Danzig would invite conflict. It was clear by the 31st that Polish resolve had been stiffened by London and Paris. On that day, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons, assuring Warsaw that, in the event of a German attack, Britain and France would stand by the Poles. That evening, Hitler ordered Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German high command), to prepare for Poland. On April 3, Keitel issued a directive known as “White,” ordering the German armed forces to be ready for action no later than September 1.


German-Soviet Pact

The German-Soviet Pact, signed in August 1939, paved the way for the joint invasion and occupation of Poland that September. By signing the agreement, Hitler avoided the threat of a major two-front war. Stalin was permitted subsequently to expand Soviet rule over the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) and parts of Romania and Finland. The pact was an agreement of convenience between the two bitter ideological enemies. It permitted Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union to carve up spheres of influence in eastern Europe, while pledging not to attack each other for 10 years. Less than two years later, however, Hitler launched an invasion of the Soviet Union.

Asosiy faktlar

This agreement often is commonly referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, after the two foreign ministers who negotiated the deal. It is also known as the Nazi-Soviet Pact, or the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

The diplomatic arrangement included a 10-year non-aggression pact between the two countries, economic cooperation, and territorial expansion.

The pact prepared the way for World War II.

Bu kontent quyidagi tillarda mavjud

The German-Soviet Pact is also known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact after the two foreign ministers who negotiated the agreement: German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov. The pact had two parts. An economic agreement, signed on August 19, 1939, provided that Germany would exchange manufactured goods for Soviet raw materials. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union also signed a ten-year nonaggression pact on August 23, 1939, in which each signatory promised not to attack the other.

The German-Soviet Pact enabled Germany to attack Poland on September 1, 1939, without fear of Soviet intervention. On September 3, 1939, Britain and France, having guaranteed to protect Poland's borders five months earlier, declared war on Germany. These events marked the beginning of World War II.

The nonaggression pact of August 23 contained a secret protocol that provided for the partition of Poland and the rest of eastern Europe into Soviet and German spheres of interest.

In accordance with this plan, the Soviet army occupied and annexed eastern Poland in the autumn of 1939. On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Finland, precipitating a four-month winter war after which the Soviet Union annexed Finnish territory borderlands, particularly near Leningrad. With German indulgence, the Soviet Union also moved to secure its sphere of interest in eastern Europe in the summer of 1940. The Soviets occupied and incorporated the Baltic states and seized the Romanian provinces of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia.

After the Germans defeated France in June 1940, German diplomats worked to secure Germany's ties in southeastern Europe. Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia all joined the Axis alliance in November 1940. During the spring of 1941, Hitler initiated his eastern European allies into plans to invade the Soviet Union.

Hitler had always regarded the German-Soviet nonaggression pact as a tactical and temporary maneuver. On December 18, 1940, he signed Directive 21 (code-named Operation Barbarossa), the first operational order for the invasion of the Soviet Union. From the beginning of operational planning, German military and police authorities intended to wage a war of annihilation against the Communist state as well as the Jews of the Soviet Union, whom they characterized as forming the "racial basis" for the Soviet state.

German forces invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, less than two years after the German-Soviet Pact was signed.


The Nazi-Soviet Pact: Hitler’s Ultimate Triumph

To fulfill his territorial ambitions in Europe, Hitler agreed to sign a pact with the Soviet Union in 1939. (Image: Bundesarchiv/Heinrich Hoffmann/CC BY-SA 3.0/Public domain)

A Polish Problem

Once again, one saw the usual drumroll: German minorities mistreated by the Polish government, some sort of representation for the German minority had to be made, the German population wasn’t going to stand for more of this. At this point, so grave was the threat that Franklin Roosevelt took the extraordinary step of writing a public letter to Hitler, in which there was a laundry list of states that he wanted Hitler to say that Germany wasn’t going to attack.

And Hitler got up in the Reichstag, now obviously all Nazi, and gave one of his most ironic and sarcastic speeches. In that speech, Hitler made no promises, and he continued to assert that Danzig wasn’t worth a war he wanted some solution to this now new Polish problem.

Nonetheless, he also gave orders to his military “to attack Poland at the earliest possible opportunity.” So, while publicly protesting that he’s trying to find a way for peace, Poland now becomes first on the agenda.

Bu video seriyali transkript A History of Hitler’s Empire, 2nd Edition. Hozir tomosha qiling, Wondrium.

The Worsening Conditions in Europe

Pressure was mounting on Neville Chamberlain’s government. Would it indeed honor its obligation to Poland? The key to the diplomatic situation in the summer and early fall of 1939, however, wasn’t in London the key was in Moscow.

The British and French had tried at various points over the summer to warn the Soviets about the imminent danger. But they were low-level contacts Chamberlain certainly didn’t fly off to Moscow to talk with Stalin. Meanwhile, the Germans took this up at a much higher level.

The Nazi Offer to the Soviet Union

German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop had begun to send feelers to his counterpart in the Soviet Union, Molotov, about the possibility of some sort of deal between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Finally, Ribbentrop offered the possibility of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.

For Hitler, this pact made no ideological sense whatsoever. These were the two great ideological enemies. If Hitler was determined to smash Judeo-Bolshevism in the Soviet Union, Stalin saw Nazi Germany as the incarnation of evil. It was the great fascist power that was the greatest threat to Socialism in the world. But in a practical sense, there was a good deal of compelling evidence to support signing such a pact.

Hitler’s Aggressive Determination

Germany sealed the deal with the Soviet Union and pushed Europe toward the Second World War. (Image: Bundesarchiv/CC-BY-SA/3.0/Public domain)

Hitler, who was determined by this point to go to war with Poland, believed that a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union would act as a deterrent to the West. England and France wouldn’t dare intervene if the Soviet Union were already in the same boat as Nazi Germany.

And, of course, at the same time and more obviously, it would remove the danger of a two-front war for Germany. And Hitler was determined to avoid this at all cost.

Stalin’s Stance on the Non-Aggression Pact

For Stalin, the pact also made sense. Number one, it would buy time. In 1938, the Soviet Union and Stalin had initiated a massive purge of the Red Army. Not just the leadership, but a purge that went all the way down to company level, inserting political commissars to make sure the army was under direct Bolshevist/Communist control.

International intelligence experts believed that the Soviet military was extremely weak as a result, and so, this would buy time to rebuild his military. It would also provide territorial and strategic advantages in Eastern Europe.

The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

On August 24, 1939, Germany and Russia astonished the world by signing a non-aggression pact—the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact—in Moscow, pledging not to go to war with one another. There were secret clauses, which divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence.

Germany was to get Lithuania and Vilne the Soviet Union Finland, Estonia, Latvia. They agreed on a partition of Poland. Germans would move in from the west, the Soviets from the east. They couldn’t agree about Romania, which had rich oil fields, but the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the death knell for the state of Poland—and for peace in Europe.

The Unpreparedness of Germany

Despite a four-year plan that began in 1936 to build the German economy, it wasn’t ready for a long war. It could fight a limited war, such as one against Poland. It reflected Hitler’s conviction that the West wouldn’t fight. The Germans had followed a policy of armaments in breadth, not in depth, so that they had lots of different sorts of military equipment, but it hadn’t been built in any sort of depth to sustain a long war.

On September 1, 1939, the German population was awakened to a news bulletin that the Poles had attacked a German radio station on the frontier, and that German troops had been responding. In fact, the Germans had launched a massive invasion of Poland that, within a month, would bring the defeat of the Polish military.

A Shock for Hitler

To Hitler’s great astonishment, Britain and France decided to honor their obligations. Chamberlain issued an ultimatum to Germany: move out of Poland and then we can talk about the corridor, we can talk about Danzig. Hitler refused.

The Polish campaign was over in a month. The Poles fought heroically against overwhelming German force. Warsaw was bombed, signaling already that this wouldn’t be a war like the First War, where there was a distinction between front and the homefront.

Now civilians were already on the front line with the bombing of Warsaw. What Hitler had believed would be a short engagement against Poland now threatened to be the European-wide war which he did not believe would happen and was not prepared to fight.

On August 24, 1939, Germany and Russia signed a non-aggression pact.

According to the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact , Germany was to get Lithuania and Vilne the Soviet Union Finland, Estonia, Latvia. Germany and Russia agreed on a partition of Poland.

Hitler believed that a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union would act as a deterrent to the West.


BIBLOGRAFIYA

Gorodetsky, Gabriel. The Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. 1999.

Ierace, Francis A. America and the Nazi-Soviet Pact. 1978.

Kolasky, John. Partners in Tyranny. 1990.

Read, Anthony, and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1941. 1988.

Roberts, Geoffrey. The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler. 1989.

Suziedelis, Saulius, ed. History and Commemoration in the Baltic: The Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1989. 1989.


NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939

The Nazi-Soviet Pact is the name given to the Treaty of Non-Aggression signed by Ribbentrop for Germany and Molotov for the USSR on August 23,1939.

In August 1939, following the failure of attempts to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain and France for mutual assistance and military support to protect the USSR from an invasion by Adolf Hitler, the Soviet Union abandoned its attempts to achieve collective security agreements, which was the basis of Maxim Maximovich Litvinov's foreign policy during the 1930s. Instead, Soviet leaders sought an accommodation with Germany. For German politicians, the dismissal of Litvinov and the appointment of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov as commissar for foreign affairs on May 3, 1939, was a signal that the USSR was seeking a rapprochement. The traditional interpretation that Molotov was pro-German, and that his appointment was a direct preparation for the pact, has been called into question. It seems more likely that in appointing Molotov, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin was prepared to seize any opportunity that presented itself to improve Soviet security.

Diplomatic contact with Germany on economic matters had been maintained during the negotiations with Great Britain and France, and in June and July of 1939, Molotov was not indifferent to initial German approaches for an improvement in political relations. On August 15, the German ambassador proposed that Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, should visit Moscow for direct negotiations with Stalin and Molotov, who in response suggested a non-aggression pact.

Ribbentrop flew to Moscow on August 23, and the Treaty of Nonaggression was signed in a few hours. By its terms the Soviet Union and Germany undertook not to attack each other either alone or in conjunction with other powers and to remain neutral if the other power became involved in a war with a third party. They further agreed not to participate in alliances aimed at the other state and to resolve disputes and conflicts by consultation and arbitration. With Hitler about to attack Poland, the usual provision in treaties of this nature, allowing one signatory to opt out if the other committed aggression against a third party, was missing. The agreement was for a ten – year period, and became active as soon as signed, rather than on ratification.

As significant as the treaty, and more notorious, was the Secret Additional Protocol that was attached to it, in which the signatories established their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. It was agreed that "in the event of a territorial and political rearrangement" in the Baltic states, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia were in the USSR's sphere of influence and Lithuania in Germany's. Poland was divided along the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San, placing Ukrainian and Belorussian territories in the Soviet sphere of influence, together with a part of ethnic Poland in Warsaw and Lublin provinces. The question of the maintenance of an independent Poland and its frontiers was left open. In addition, Germany declared itself "disinterested" in Bessarabia.

The treaty denoted the USSR's retreat into neutrality when Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and Great Britain and France declared war. Poland collapsed rapidly, but the USSR delayed until September 17 before invading eastern Poland, although victory was achieved within a week. From November 1939, the territory was incorporated in the USSR. Estonia and Latvia were forced to sign mutual assistance treaties with the USSR and to accept the establishment of Soviet military bases in September and October of 1939. Finnish resistance to Soviet proposals to improve the security of Leningrad through a mutual assistance treaty led to the Soviet – Finnish War (1939 – 1940). Lithuania was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence in a supplementary agreement signed on September 28, 1939, and signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR in October. Romania ceded Bessarabia following a Soviet ultimatum in June 1940.

It is often argued that, in signing the treaty, Stalin, who always believed that Hitler would attack the USSR for lebensraum, was seeking time to prepare the Soviet Union for war, and hoped for a considerably longer period than he received, for Germany invaded during June of 1941. Considerable efforts were made to maintain friendly relations with Germany between 1939 and 1941, including a November 1940 visit by Molotov to Berlin for talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop.

The Secret Protocol undermined the socialist foundations of Soviet foreign policy. It called for the USSR to embark upon territorial expansion, even if this was to meet the threat to its security presented by Germany's conquest of Poland. This may explain why, for a long period, the Secret Protocol was known only from the German copy of the document: The Soviet Union denied its existence, a position that Molotov maintained until his death in 1986. The Soviet originals were published for the first time in 1993.

In all Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, during August 1987, during the glastnost era, demonstrations on the anniversary of the pact were evidence of resurgent nationalism. In early 1990 the states declared their independence, the first real challenge to the continued existence of the USSR.

Shuningdek qarang: germany, relations with molotov, vyacheslav mikhailovich world war ii


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